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Between 1900 and the commencement of the First World War in 1914, the Russian 
government under Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917) engineered an expansion of its European based 
espionage agency called the Foreign Agentura. During that period, Italy had become a haven for 
Russian extremists and the Italian government challenged Russia for hegemonic influence in the 
Balkans. The combination of these issues magnified the threat Italy posed to the success of the 
foreign policy toward Europe. Strangely, Russia did not open a branch of the Foreign Agentura 
in the southern Mediterranean state of Italy. While the Okhrana’s spy operations seemed to have 
flourished in France, Germany, Great Britain, as well as in the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman 
Empires, it seems to have lacked the required organizational prowess to infiltrate Italy. This 
thesis seeks to isolate the historical factors that influenced Russia’s failure to open a division of 
Foreign Agentura in Italy. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Purpose of Study 
Introduction 
Between 1900 and the commencement of the First World War in 1914, the Russian 
government gradually amplified the scope of its counter-revolutionary operations by increasing 
the numerical size of the empire’s most powerful political police organization called the 
Okhrana.1 The agency’s expansion over this timeframe, which was managed by Russia’s 
Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD),2 specifically focused on the further development of its 
international wing known as the Foreign Agentura. The entire project was sanctioned by Tsar 
Nicholas II (1894-1917) in response to a worsening anti-tsarist sociopolitical climate across the 
empire the during final years of the 19th century. More important, the monarch harbored a deep 
trepidation over the Okhrana’s capability to stymie the Russian émigré intelligentsia’s attempts 
to orchestrate a coup d’état from continent. Before adding to its existing cohort of agents that 
were attached to the Foreign Agentura singular outpost in Paris, the MVD clandestinely 
established new branches of the Okhrana in both Galicia (Poland)3 and Berlin.4 During the same 
year, a division called the Balkans Agency was installed in Bucharest (Romania).5  Between 
 
1 The term Okhrana or Okhranka was an acronym that was a derivative of Otdeleniye to Okhraneniyu 
Obshchestvennoy Bezopasnosti I Poryadka which translates to The Department for Protecting Public Security and 
Order. 
 
2 The acronym MVD comes from Ministers Vnutrennikh Del which is Russian translation for the empire’s “Ministry 
of Internal Affairs" or "Ministry of the Interior." 
 
3 Lauchlan, Iain. Russian Hide-and-seek: The Tsarist Secret Police in St. Petersburg, 1906-1914, 94. Helsinki: 
Finnish Literature Society, 2002.  Lauchlan uses “Galicia” to refer to what would be the Polish state after World 
War I. 
 
4 Lauchlan, 356 
 
5 ibid, 101 
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1906 and 1909, the Ministry placed secret agents in London, where they worked clandestinely 
from the office of a ‘cover firm’ called the Russian Imperial Financial Agency.6  In 1911, Russia 
added another bureau called the Balkans Agency in the Ottoman Empire’s capital of 
Constantinople.7 
 The term “intelligentsia” was a broad classification for Russia’s cultural elite and was 
comprised of “the educated and enlightened segment of society.”8  Up to the1880s, they 
challenged the autocratic rule of the Russian monarchy but had been chased into political exile 
outside of the empire by the Okhrana during the tenure of Tsar Alexander III, Nicholas’ father 
and predecessor. From these new satellite offices of the Foreign Agentura throughout Europe, 
undercover agents hunted exiled members of the Russian émigré intelligentsia such as Mikhail 
Bakunin, Peter Kropotkin, Valerie Burtsev and Vladimir Lenin. On the continent, these 
individuals engaged in fomenting revolutionary extremism abroad. Usually, they attempted to 
evade arrest by the Okhrana’s legion of covert operatives by hiding among immigrant enclaves 
of the Russian diaspora in urban centers. Foreign Agentura agents uncovered the plots of their 
co-conspirators and acolytes by infiltrating revolutionary organizations in order to stop them 
from smuggling propaganda literature, weapons, and ammunition into the empire. Russia also 
used the Agentura to spy on government and military officials of the respective countries in 
which they were placed. The Okhrana’s espionage operations abroad were carried out in order to 
assuage Russia’s critical geopolitical concerns. Chief among these issues was the security of the 
 
 
6 ibid, 103 
 
7 ibid, 207 
 
8 Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky, D.N. Istoria Russkoi Intelligentsii in Sobranie-Sochinenii, 5. St. Petersburg, 
   1910. 
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empire’s large expanse of unguarded borderland territory which the Russian empire shared with 
Germany, the Austro-Hungarian Empire and the Ottoman state.  For this reason, the expansion of 
the Okhrana was a critical component of Russian foreign policy in the late 19th century as it 
allowed Russia to closely monitor both its regional and international rivals. 
During the early 20th century expansion of Russia’s spy network, Italy had become a 
haven for members of the Russian émigré intelligentsia such as Valery Burtsev and Maxim 
Gorky, who were also fugitives of the Okhrana. At that juncture, the Italian government had an 
official diplomatic alliance with both Germany and the Austria-Hungarian polity. More 
significantly, it also challenged Russia for hegemonic influence in the Balkans.  From 1900, the 
nearby region had become an important territory in the scheme of Italy’s imperialist ambitions. 
The combination of these issues magnified the threat Italy posed to the success of the 
geopolitical maneuverings of Nicholas’ government. Strangely, Russia did not open a branch of 
the Foreign Agentura in the southern Mediterranean state of Italy. While the Okhrana’s spy 
operations seemed to have flourished in France, Germany, Great Britain, as well as in the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, it seems to have lacked the required organizational 
prowess to infiltrate Italy. Why did Russia fail to open a division of Foreign Agentura in Italy, 






(Brief) Historical Background 
 4 
On March 13th 1881, Tsar Alexander II (1855-1881) fell victim to an assassination plot 
by members of an anarchist 9 sect that called itself  “The People’s Will.”10  The shocking murder 
of the 62-year-old Russian monarch both stunned and caused panic among the Russian ruling 
elites.11 Collectively, the aristocracy interpreted the Tsar's murder as strong evidence that their 
privileged position atop Russian society was in jeopardy due to an upsurge of politically-
motivated extremist violence. For his successor and second son Alexander III (1881-1894), the 
protection of the Russian elites was a priority along with the preservation of his rule. These two 
important objectives were contingent upon his ability to eradicate all forms of anti-government 
dissent from his empire. Almost immediately after his unexpected ascension to the throne, the 
new Tsar “became fixated on administrative justice aimed at ridding Russian society of those 
who represented a threat, no matter how slight or tenuous, to the continued well-being of the 
governing and ruling elites.”12 Alexander III re-established the state's authoritative dominance 
over Russian society by engineering a massive overhaul of its internal policing system. The Tsar 
then used his new police force to eliminate all forms of political dissent in Russia.    
Alexander’s transformation of the empire’s police system saw the creation of a new 
police unit called the Okhrana. This new squadron was made up of a small, elite team of 
detectives, who were trained to carry out a widespread secret surveillance of Russian society. 
 
9 Thorup, Mikkel. An Intellectual History of Terror. War, Violence and the State, 1st ed., 192. London: Routledge, 
2012. Thorup contends that "It was ‘anarchism’ and ‘anarchists’- as well as nihilists, dynamiters, Blanquists, 
assassins, social revolutionists, fanatics- rather than ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ which were used in most of the 
nineteenth century to describe what we would today term terrorist acts." 
 
10 The English translation of the sect’s Russian name: Narodnaya Volnya  
 
11 Lauchlan, 12 
 
12 Zuckerman, Fredric Scott. “The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society: 1880-1917.1st ed.,15. New York: New 
York University Press, 1996. 
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The Okhrana’s agents were specifically tasked with monitoring members of the Russian 
intelligentsia. Alexander III blamed the intelligentsia’s radicalization of the country’s peasantry, 
urban industrial workers, growing educated middle class as well as university students for the 
exponential increase in political violence in Russia. He also believed that their deliberate 
agitation of these social classes was designed to incite a revolution and had led directly to his 
father’s brutal murder. The Okhrana’s incessant intimidation and harassment of the Russian 
intelligentsia was instrumental in the success of Alexander III’s political repression throughout 
the empire. In order to escape arrest and incarceration by the Russian police, many of these 
individuals were forced to flee to Europe.   
While living as political exiles, members of the Russian intelligentsia continued their 
political crusade against the Tsar overseas as they “discovered that relatively greater freedom in 
the West to engage in anti-regime activities.”13 Some of Europe’s ruling elites became fearful 
that the influx of revolutionary-minded extremists from Russia had created a climate of anti-
establishment sentiment across the continent. Alexander III responded to their concerns by 
offering the services of the Okhrana to help these European governments deal with Russian 
radicals who were fomenting revolution in their respective countries. Initially, no European 
leader openly accepted Russia’s assistance. In 1883, the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) 
established an international branch of the Okhrana called the Foreign Agentura.  This new 
division was created in order to allow Russia’s secret police to have the ability to search for and 
capture the members of the émigré intelligentsia who lived abroad. Paris was chosen as the 
location for the inaugural office of the Agentura. Agents operated clandestinely from the 
 
13 Fisher, Ben B. Okhrana, the Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police,1st ed.,1. Washington, DC: Center 
for the Study of Intelligence, 1997 
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basement of the Russian embassy located on 79 de Grenelle Street.14  At the time, the French 
capital had become the hub for Russian revolutionary groups operating in much of Europe.15 
Also, the city was “the home to a Russian diaspora community estimated at roughly 5,000 
immigrants.”16 Members of Russia’s exiled intelligentsia would often attempt to remain 
undetected by hiding among the Russophone diaspora in Europe. In 1900, the Russian 
government expanded espionage operations of the Okhrana by gradually creating new sections in 
Europe, the Ottoman Empire and Asia.   
 
Depictions of Foreign Agentura in Russian Historiography 
The academic literature on the Foreign Agentura has been limited and has been 
traditionally devoid of analytical diversity because "professional historians have, for the most 
part, ignored the subject."17 Many of the historical monographs on the Okhrana were written 
during the latter half of the 20th century following the opening of the Hoover Institute's Okhrana 
Archive to the public during the early 1960s. The scholarly analysis of the Imperial Russian 
espionage agency has explored the socio-political dynamics which surrounded revolutionary 
struggle of the Russian intelligentsia against the Okhrana, its pivotal role in counterterrorism 
activities in pre-World War I industrial Europe, and the imprint on the organizational 
infrastructure Russia’s post-October Revolution security agencies such as the Cheka, NKVD and 
 
14 Zuckerman, Frederic S. The Tsarist Secret Police Abroad, 1st ed.,43. New York: New York University Press, 
1996. 
 
15 Hingley, Ronald. The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial Russian, and Soviet Political Security 
Operations, 1st ed., 72. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1971. 
 
16 Fisher, Ben B. Okhrana, the Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police,1st ed.,1. Washington, DC: Center 
for the Study of Intelligence, 1997. 
 
17 Zuckerman, Fredrick S. The Tsarist Secret Police in Russian Society, 1880-1917, 3. Basingstoke: Springer, 1996. 
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the KGB. The lack of analytical diversity in the historiography has influenced a tendency among 
Russian scholars to exaggerate the Okhrana’s profound influence on 20th century international 
espionage, its leadership, the tactical and organizational acumen of its top officers as well as its 
attempt to save the Romanov dynasty from its eventual demise in 1917.  
The historiographical trend among Russian scholars to over accentuate the positive 
qualities of the Foreign Agentura when evaluating the Okhrana perhaps has been influenced by 
the analysis of legendary historian Richard Pipes. In his seminal text entitled Russia Under the 
Old Regime 1919-1924 (1974), the pioneering (western) historian asserts that the Okhrana’s 
techniques in police rule, introduced piecemeal by the Russian imperial regime, were perfected 
by their enemies, the Germans, in the Second World War.18  Perhaps, Pipes’ aggrandizement of 
the agency’s impact on espionage on the continent is a perspective that was guided by the 
musings of people such as A.T. Vassilyev. His autobiographical memoir, entitled The Ochrana: 
The Russian Secret Police (1930), is filled with hyperbolic recollections of the time he served as 
the last director of Imperial Russia’s internal police force and controlled the covert police 
division until the downfall of the Tsarist regime.19 Throughout the text, Vassilyev often 
highlights the failures of the Tsarist bureaucracy while he reiterates the herculean task of his 
defunct agency to preserve the Romanov dynasty. The former Okhrana chief believed that to 
ensure the survival of “Russia’s system of Tsardom, the Okhrana's was indispensable” 20 and his 
 
18 Pipes, Richard. Russia Under the Old Regime 1919-1924, 1st ed., 317, New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1974. 
 
19 Vassilyev was the last Tsarist Chief of Police before Nicholas II's abdication from the throne on 15 March 1917. 
This position also placed him in charge of the country's internal Okhrana (The "Fontanka" and the Special Section 
(Osoby Otdel or OO). 
 
20 Vassilyev, A. T., and René Fülöp-Miller. The Ochrana, the Russian Secret Police., 25. London: Harrap, 
    1930. 
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only regret was that “the Police did not proceed with such strictness as (it) would have prevented 
the accursed Revolution (1917).”21  
Author Richard Deacon supports Vassilyev's assertions about the brilliance of the 
Okhrana. In the opening page of his book, A History of the Russian Secret Service (1972), the 
British historian writes that “European governments were in awe of the Foreign Agentura’s 
prowess as a ruthlessly efficient counter-espionage organization.”22 In his portrayal of the 
revolutionary conflict between the Okhrana and Russian radical intelligentsia, explorer and 
writer George Kennan also typify the historiographical tendency. He described the contest 
between them as “something like a dual between the mightiest power on earth, armed with all the 
attributes of authority on one side, and an insignificant gang of discharged telegraph operators, 
half-educated seminaries, high-school boys, and university students, miserable little Jews and 
loose women on the other.”23 Historian Frederick S. Zuckerman also makes similar 
proclamations in his exposé on Russian Imperial foreign espionage entitled The Tsarist Secret 
Police Abroad: Policing Europe in a Modernizing World (2003). In the text’s Preface, the 
English scholar writes that the Foreign Agentura “operated in non-Russian Europe as a critical, 
indispensable element of the maturing European political police network.”24 Ben B. Fisher is 
another scholar who exemplifies the tendency among historians to accentuate the brilliance of 
the Okhrana. In his treatise on the Russian spy agency, entitled The Paris Operations of the 




22 Deacon, Richard. A History of the Russian Secret Service, 1st ed., 1. New York: Taplinger Publishing 
    Company, 1972. 
 
23 Walsh, WB. Russia and the Soviet Union, 395. University of Michigan Press, 1968., 
 
24 Zuckerman, xvi 
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Okhrana”25  as well as “the KGB decades later, learned from and improved on the tsarist police's 
repressive methods.”26 
The historiographical trend among Russian scholars to over accentuate the positive 
qualities of the Foreign Agentura is also conspicuous in their attempt tos highlight the mystique 
surrounding the agency despite its failure to prevent the collapse of the monarchy.  In the tenth 
chapter of his book, which was dedicated entirely to the Foreign Agentura’s first and longest 
serving director 27 Paul Rachkovsky, Deacon opines that, over the course of his nearly two 
decades as the Agentura chief, “no secret service chief of his time was so subtle and used 
espionage so adroitly to bring about changes in foreign policy.”28  However, in the chapter, 
Deacon neglects to mention Rachkovsky’s repeated failures to convince either the British or 
Italian governments to cooperate with the Foreign Agentura.  Also throughout the rest of the 
chapter, Deacon also fails to mention that Rachkovsky was an overt anti-Semite , yet he 
somehow devotes three final pages to his explanation of the historical plausibility that Jack the 
Ripper was an Okhrana agent.29 At the end of this analysis, Deacon still manages to offer the 
unsubstantiated theory that the Okhrana was an “example of the incalculable workings of 
Russian agent provocateurs at the end of the (20th) century.”30  
 
 
25 Fischer, Ben B. Okhrana: The Paris Operations of the Russian Imperial Police, 1st ed., 13. 
    Washington, D.C.: ICON Group International, 1997.  
 
26 ibid, 13 
 
27 Rachkovsky was the Chief of the Okhrana’s Foreign Agentura from March 1885 until November 1902. 
 
28 Deacon, 118 
 
29 ibid, 128-131 
 
30 ibid, 131 
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Purpose of Study 
The goal of this project is to seek answers to Russia's failure to open a bureau of the 
Okhrana in Italy between 1900 and the start of World War I. This essay aims to achieve this 
objective through its specific investigation into the reasons why the Russian government was 
unsuccessful in this endeavor, despite the numerous geopolitical conundrums Italy provided, 
which hindered Russian foreign policy objectives concerning Europe. By answering this research 
question, I argue that Russia was not immune to experiencing major organizational setbacks that 
limited the Foreign Agentura’s prowess in achieving its objectives in Europe. I will argue further 
that there were three important factors which limited the agency’s ability to infiltrate Italy. First, 
Italy’s aggressive, anti-Russian foreign policy hindered the Tsarist government’s ability to 
negotiate a solid inter-governmental cooperation between them.  Second, the two country’s 
acerbic geopolitical rapport severely diminished Russia’s ability to formulate a police alliance 
that was advantageous to St. Petersburg. Third, Italy’s unique sociopolitical culture stymied the 
effectiveness of the surveillance, espionage and counter-revolutionary propaganda tactics that the 
Okhrana used successfully elsewhere on the continent. Ultimately, I hope that this thesis could 
help shift the historiographical assessment of the Okhrana’s international wing toward a new 
trajectory by using my discoveries to counterbalance the propensity of scholars to inaccurately 
over-embellish the Foreign Agentura's prowess as an espionage agency. 
 
Research Materials 
Key Primary Sources  
My research for this project was heavily influenced by my analysis of primary source 
data, which was located at the Central Archive of the Italian State (Archivio Centrale Della 
 11 
Stato), in Rome, between December 15th 2017 and January 8th 2018.  These archives hold the 
documents that all Italian state offices deposited 40 years after the records were created. The 
records of the offices of the Prime Minister, the ministries, and other central bodies are sent to 
the Central State Archives in Rome and files originating from regional offices are sent to the 
appropriate State Archives in each province. On my first visit to the Italian archival headquarters, 
I provided details about the historical parameters of my study to the curators. After a short wait, I 
was permitted to view a collection of files they had deemed pertinent to my research. During 
each of my six subsequent visits, I was fortunate to access a large collection of primary source 
documents which contained hundreds of declassified correspondences between various Italian 
government ministries and the country’s regional police departments. Using these documents, 
Italian authorities shared confidential intelligence which detailed observations from the 
surveillance of the Russian diaspora.   
The majority of the archival files I analyzed were sent from the police bureau in Genoa to 
the Italian Ministry of Internal Security (Ministero dell’Interno). A small subset came from 
Mediterranean resort towns along the Italian Riviera such as Port Maurizio, La Spezia and San 
Remo. Many of the files contained arrest warrants, minutes from interrogations, physical 
descriptions of suspects as well as a comprehensive analysis of the suspect’s or group’s daily 
activities. Prior to the commencement of my archival research, I was guided to these resources 
by two texts. These were Paola Carucci's Italian Archival Sources: Organization and 
Conservation (1983)31 as well as Franca and Armando Petrucci’s Writing Relations: Essays for 
American Scholars in Italian archives (2008).  Each text provided details of what types of 
 
31 Carucci, Paola. Le Fonti Archivistiche: Ordinamento e Conservazione, 1st ed. Roma: Carocci, 1983. 
 
 12 
primary sources pertaining to my topic were located among the various collections of Italy’s 
archival system. 
 During my access to these primary sources in the Italian archive headquarters, the 
documents I discovered shed light on critical themes pertaining to my quest to decipher why 
Russia did not establish an outpost of the Okhrana in Italy between the turn of the 20th century 
and 1914. Several weeks later, I began to cross reference the names listed in these documents 
with the Hoover Institute’s Okhrana Archive database of the Foreign Agentura targets.32 Based 
on files I investigated, some of the names that were recorded by the Italian police as Russian 
terrorists in Liguria between 1900 and 1914, were also listed as Okhrana targets.  In addition, I 
also compared these names with those I found on the intercepted letters of Russian 
revolutionaries, which had been collected by the Okhrana’s ‘Special Section’ in St. Petersburg 
(Fifth Department of the Special Section of the Department of Police (secret unit). Between 1883 
and 1917, these Russian language letters were organized and filed by date, month and year, per 
the orders of the Russian empire’s Department of Police of the Imperial Russian Ministry of 
Internal Affairs. My investigation of these documents allowed me to compare this information 
with the secondary sources that discussed aspects of the Okhrana’s international operations. 
From that process, I formulated my conclusions on the nature of the relationship between the 
Italian police and the Okhrana, their obsession with fugitive Russian extremists and the attitude 
of the Italian government toward the expatriate Russian community in Liguria between 1900 and 
World War I. 
 
Key Secondary Sources 
 
32 "Register of the Okhrana Records." Online Archive of California. Accessed September 7, 2018.  
      https://oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt 
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  In writing this thesis, I researched information from several relevant secondary sources to 
triangulate data I found in the archival reservoir of Central Archive of the Italy in Rome.  These 
texts focus on key social, political and economic influences on the Foreign Agentura’s operations 
between the start of Alexander III's rule (1881) and the October Revolution (1917). Many of 
these were monographs on the topic which were written by Western (American/British), Russian 
and Italian scholars. During my research, these books emerged as crucial points of reference 
which I used in trying to attain answers to the central question of this project. I studied academic 
works from authors who discussed both the evolution of the Okhrana, its organizational 
hierarchy of command, and its role in Russian foreign policy during the respective tenures of 
Tsars Alexander III and Nicholas I.  My research was aided by a core group of historical 
monographs on the Imperial Russian espionage agency. The most important secondary sources 
include Iain Lachlan’s Russian Hide and Seek: The Tsarist Police in St. Petersburg, 1905-1914, 
(2002); Frederic S. Zuckerman’s The Tsarist Secret Police and Russian Society, 1880-1917 
(1996) and The Tsarist Secret Police Abroad (2003); Richard Deacon’s A History of the Russian 
Secret Service (1972); Ronald Hingley’s The Russian Secret Police: Muscovite, Imperial 
Russian, Soviet Political and Security Operations (1971); and Ben Fisher’s Okhrana, the Paris 
Operations of the Russian Imperial Police (1997). Each of these works trace the evolution of the 
Foreign Agentura from the deliberations about its establishment within the Russian government 
to the decision by the Bolsheviks to disband the Okhrana. Also, Paul Avrich’s Russian 
Anarchists (2015) was another important secondary source I employed in this study. A Princeton 
University professor’s text discusses the history of European anti-establishment anarchist 
movements from its Russian origins in the 19th century, its upsurge in the 1905 and 1917 
revolutions, and its decline and fall after the Bolshevik Revolution.  
 14 
In addition to those historical monographs, my research led me to seek information on the 
history of Russia revolutionary activity in Italy, the cultural dynamics of Italy’s Russian émigré 
community and its impact on Italian society. Luca Einaudi’s Russian Exiles in Italy (Esuli Russi 
in Italia): 1905-1917 (2002) and The Politics of Immigration in Italy from Unification to Today 
(Le Politiche dell’Immigrazione in Italia Dall’Unita ad Oggi) (2007) were two excellent Italian 
language resources which explain the intersectionality of those three cultural phenomena. 
Einaudi’s texts were also useful as secondary source which I employed in my research 
triangulation technique to verify the validity of the names I discovered on the primary source 
documents I investigated. In these texts, Einaudi also provides a detailed demographical 
breakdown of immigration to Italy which includes information on the migration of people from 
the Russian empire.  The data he presents in these two books provides quantitative data which 
allows for crucially formulating a mental picture of the size of the Russian community during the 
timeframe in comparison to other immigrant groups who assimilated into the population of Italy 
at large. Other beneficial Italian language texts include Giovanni Mapelli’s Language, Identity 
and Immigration (Lingua, Identita and Immigrazione) (2010), Asher Colomgo and Guiseppi 
Sciortino’s Immigrants in Italy (Gli Immigranti in Italia) (2004), Paolo Buchignani’s Rebels in 
Italy (Ribelli d’Italia) (2017).and Renato Risalti’s Russi in Italia tra Settecento e Novecento 
(2010) (Russians in Italy between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Century) helped formulate an 
understanding of the “push” and “pull” factors which brought Russians (and Russophone 
migrants) to the Italian peninsula from the late 19th century to the early years of the 29th century. 
Some important Russian secondary-source texts that I investigated during my research include Z. 
Peregudova’s Okhranka: memoirs of the leaders of a political investigation (2004), Uril 
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Arsenovich’s Public and Political Policies of Russia (1900-1917) and A.T Vassilyev’s The 
Ochrana, the Russian Secret Police (1930). 
 
Online Sources 
In addition to these primary and secondary sources, the database of russinitalia.com was 
crucial in finding critical information on the Russian community in Italy between the late 19th 
century and the commencement of World War I. This website was part of a collaborative effort 
of the Italian Ministry of Culture Heritage and Activities (Ministero per i Beni e le Attività 
Culturali or  MiBAC), Ministry of Public Education (Ministero della Pubblica Istruzione, 
or MPI) ,Ministry of University and Scientific Research (Ministero dell'Università e della 
Ricerca scientifica), the University of Salerno (Università degli Studi di Salerno, or UNISA) as 
well as a number of Italian scholars  who represent a wide range of disciplines connected with 
the exploration of Russo-Italian cross-cultural pollination in literature, the arts, science and 
music. This website’s extensive database contains a category entitled “Russi in Italia: 
Dizionario” (Russians in Italy: Dictionary) which alphabetically lists of the names of individuals 
who emigrated from Imperial Russia as far back as the First Crimean War (1853-1856) through 
till the end of the Russia’s Soviet era.33 In the majority of the cases, each listing also includes a 
chronological profile which includes an individual’s place of birth, death, occupation, marriage 
status and their contribution to Italian society during their time in Italy. The sub-sections entitled 
called “Luoghi Russi in Italia” (Russian places in Italy) 34and “Instituzioni Politiche and 
 
33 "Russi in Italia." Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca scientifica (d'Italia). Last modified April 1, 
     2020. https://www.russinitalia.it/archiviodettaglio.php?id=70. 
 
34 "Luoghi russi in Italia." Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca scientifica. Last modified April 1, 
      2020. https://www.russinitalia.it/luoghi.php. 
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Culturali” (Political and Cultural Institutions)35 helped me to map the distribution of Russian 
communities throughout Italy as well as to gain insight into the importance of Liguria, the Italian 
Riviera, Genoa and Nervi to the Russian/Russophone diasporas cultural practices in Italy.  
 
Source Limitations 
Unfortunately, while I conducted my research for this project, I was unable to travel to 
Russia in order to gain access to archival documents pertaining to the Okhrana in the State 
Archive of the Russian Federation. As a result, I could not potentially access  any of their 
collections of primary source data which contain information on topics such as Russian foreign 
policy mandates toward Italian statesmanship in the early 20th century as well as Imperial 
Russian government intelligence on Russian revolutionaries who resided in Italy. More 
importantly, because I was unable to travel to Russia, I could not find Russian primary source 
documents which could potentially prove the existence of a branch of the Okhrana in Italy or 
plans to create one in there during the expansion of the Foreign Agentura between 1900 and the 
start of the First World War. In order to offset my inability to access information from the 
Russian archives, I was able to investigate invaluable primary source data on the Imperial 
Russian spy agency from the digitized version of approximately 509 microfilm reels of Stanford 
University's Okhrana archive (Hoover Institute for the Study of War and Peace).36  I specifically 
focused on the digital collection of profiles and photographs that were taken of Russian 
 
35 "Instituzioni politiche e culturali." Ministero dell'Università e della Ricerca scientifica. Last modified 
      April 1, 2020. https://www.russinitalia.it/istituzioni.php. 
 
36 "Okhrana Records – Works – Digital Collections." Digital Collections Home – Digital Collections. 
      Accessed November 11, 2018. https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/54048/okhrana- 
        %20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20records?ctx=6a3c3b50-8d16-4f10-a653- 
        ec7993313f9d&idx=1. 
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revolutionaries in Europe by agents of the Foreign Agentura's Paris Office between 1890 and 
1910.37  I leaned on the secondary source materials from scholars such as Frederic S. Zuckerman, 
whose research explicitly involved the use of archival resources from Russia. 
 
Conclusion 
 The preceding segments of this introductory chapter have been dedicated to unveiling the 
main purpose of this project, isolating the specific timeframe of its historical focus as well as 
highlighting both the archival and scholarly sources that were analyzed in the researching of this 
topic. The primary goal of this essay is to seek answers as to why the Russian government did 
not establish an outpost of the Okhrana in Italy during the expansion of its intelligence network 
across Europe between 1900 and the commencement of World War I. There are two main 
reasons why the absence of a bureau of the Russian espionage agency on Italian soil during this 
timeframe is a conspicuous historical oddity.  First, Russian revolutionary extremists, many of 
whom were fugitives of the Foreign Agentura, hid among the Russian-speaking expatriate 
community that resided throughout the southern Mediterranean country. Second, as a result of 
Italy’s geopolitical interests in the Balkans as well as its close diplomatic ties with Germany, the 
Austro-Hungarian empire and Britain, the surveillance of the Italian government using Russian 
spies should have been a priority of the Tsarist government in the context of Russian foreign 
policy during that period. For these important reasons, it is quite puzzling that the Imperial 
Russian government did not attempt to open a branch of the Okhrana in Italy during the Foreign 
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Agentura’s roughly three-decade existence.  In order to successfully answer this question of why, 
information pertaining to the topic was gleaned from the analysis of a combination of primary 
and secondary source materials that were written in English, Italian and Russian.  
 The second chapter of this essay is devoted to providing historical background 
information pertaining to the Okhrana’s evolution as Imperial Russia’s international policing 
apparatus from its inception in 1883 through the start of the Second World War.  There are two 
reasons why tracing the development of the Foreign Agentura is a critical component to the 
overall didactic framework of this project.  First, this exercise provides an important historical 
foundation for informing the potential reader about the key social as well as international 
geopolitical factors which influenced the spy agency’s integral role in the Russian government’s 
late 19th and early 20th century counterterrorism initiatives. Second, it also provides invaluable 
insight into the rationale behind its decisions about employing the resources of the Okhrana. The 
second factor is especially crucial to solving the reason why an outpost of the Okhrana was never 
officially established in Italy after 1900 as they were in Germany, Britain, the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire and the Ottoman Empires respectively.  
In this essay’s third chapter, my intentions are to employ Italy as a historical case study to 
support my argument that Russia was not immune to experiencing major organizational setbacks 
that limited the Foreign Agentura’s ability to fulfill its foreign-policy objectives in Europe. My 
hypothesis contradicts the general depictions of the Okhrana made by the limited number of 
Russian scholars who have produced academic literature on the Okhrana. Among this group 
includes several influential Western social scientists such as historian Richard Pipes, Richard 
Deacon, Fredrick Zuckerman, Ben Fisher, Barbara Jelavich, Dominic Lieven and Gregory 
Hingley. I argue that the lack of analytical diversity in the historiography has strongly influenced 
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a tendency among these academics to over-exaggerate the Okhrana's effect on 20th-century 
international espionage, the cleverness of its agents, the ingenuity of the tactical counter-
revolutionary acumen of its directors and its pivotal role in the prevention of the Romanov 
dynasty’s demise until 1917. 
In the third chapter, based on conclusions of my in-depth research, I identify three factors 
that potentially influenced Russia’s inability to establish an Okhrana presence in Italy.  First, 
Italy’s anti-Russian foreign policy fueled Russia’s bad diplomatic relations with Italy from the 
early 1880s to World War I. Second, this poor geopolitical relationship hindered Russia’s 
inability to formulate a police alliance with Italy that was advantageous to St. Petersburg. Third, 
the evolution Italy’s unique sociopolitical culture, especially under Italian Prime Minister 
Giovanni Giolitti’s five terms in office (1892-1914/1921), stymied the effectiveness of the 








Chapter 2: The Okhrana’s Historical Evolution 
 
Introduction 
The goal of this essay is to identify the reasons why Russia did not open a division of the 
Foreign Agentura in Italy during its expansion of the Okhrana across Europe from 1900 to the 
commencement of the First World War. This enlargement of the espionage agency reflected Tsar 
Nicholas II’s fears over the émigré Russian intelligentsia’s ability to instigate a coup d’état from 
overseas. In addition, the Russia’s Ministry of the Interior (MVD) used Agentura agents to 
closely monitor the government and military officials of its geopolitical rivals in Europe. 
Russia’s failure to open an Okhrana outpost in Italy is strange because of its successful 
installation of the Foreign Agentura in nearby France, Germany, the Austria-Hungarian empire 
and Ottoman polity as well as Italy’s challenge for hegemonic influence in the Balkans. This 
chapter is devoted to providing the background historical information that will be used in the 
Chapter 3’s case study analysis and is divided into four segments. The first section traces the 
evolution of the tsarist tradition of creating secret police organizations. The second section 
discusses the origins of the Russian intelligentsia and its impact on political repression in 
Imperial Russia. The third segment discusses the creation of the Okhrana. The fourth section 
explains the social and political factors that led to the establishment of its Foreign Agentura 
division. 
 
Tsarist Tradition of using Secret Agent Organizations 
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 The Okhrana was a late 19th century evolutionary step of a behavioral tradition among 
Russian monarchs to instinctively create autonomous organizations of secret agents which they 
personally directed to identify and eliminate political threats to their autocratic rule. This trend 
originated in 1565 with Ivan the Terrible’s (1547-1575) establishment of the Oprichnina, which 
he used to nullify the aristocratic boyars' resistance to his rule in order to strengthen his position 
as the absolute ruler of Russia. The Oprichniks, or 'Oprichniki,' formed a personal cult who 
always wore black attire and purposefully rode black horses. They were handpicked by the Tsar 
to instill fear among his enemies and murdered anyone he disliked. Peter the Great (1682-1725) 
created the Preobrazhenskii Prikaz in order to monitor the Russian empire’s military regiments 
during his political struggle against his sister, Sofia. Catherine the Great (1762-1796) relied on a 
security organization called the Secret Expedition, which she used to constantly monitor her 
Imperial court for any signs of treasonous political malfeasance. Fearful of the negative influence 
of Napoleon Bonaparte’s military success, Alexander I (1801-1825) designed his own version 
called the Secret Service in 1805 to conduct the surveillance of the Imperial Army’s top military 
officials. 
 The Third Section was another incarnation of these Tsarist secret agent organizations. 
Tsar Nicholas I (1825-1855) formed the Third Section of His Imperial Majesty’s Own 
Chancellery (historically abbreviated as the Third Section) as a secret police agency because he 
also intensely mistrusted the Russian upper class due to its participation in the Decembrist revolt 
(December 1st, 1825).38  Following the death of his brother Alexander I, Nicholas’ transition to 
the throne was interrupted by an unsuccessful coup against the monarchy that was orchestrated 
by a renegade faction of high-ranking officers within the Russian army. These military leaders 
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wished to create a constitutional monarchy with a parliament in the mold of France’s post-
revolutionary political system (the First French Republic 1792-1804). Luckily, their lack of 
support from the majority of their subordinates allowed the new Tsar to quickly suppress the 
insurrection. On July 3rd 1826, Nicholas created the Third Section to spy on members of Russian 
aristocracy he did not trust. For the majority of his reign, the agency grew from sixteen persons 
in 1826 to more than forty within twenty years.39  The Third Section had no official office before 
1831 and operated all over the Russian empire with seemingly unlimited powers.40 On April 27th 
1827, the organization was given an auxiliary military branch called the Separate Corps of the 
Gendarmes that was several thousand men strong.41 These two agencies formed the Tsar’s 
political police force 42 during his thirty year reign. 
With the creation of the Third Section, the tsarist political system evolved quickly under 
Nicholas I and built the foundations of the modern espionage and counter-espionage in Russia.43  
The agency was administratively independent from the supervision of other government agencies 
with whom it shared intelligence such as the Ministry of Police, the Ministry of Justice, the 
Ministry of the Interior and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The Chief of the Third Section was 
subordinate only to the Tsar himself which simultaneously made that individual the most 
powerful employee of the state as well as the most despised among anti-Romanov Russian 
revolutionaries. Agents were mandated to conduct surveillance of foreigners and religious 
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dissenters, the uncovering and forestalling of subversive actions and were allowed to exercise a 
certain level of censorship through approving publications prior to their distribution.44  By the 
end of Tsar Nicholas I’s repressive rule, the Third Section had tentacles spread through all layers 
of society and the organization had acquired an evil reputation, as a result of its intrusive, brutal 
and corrupt conduct.45  The agency was dissolved by his successor Alexander II in 1880. Further 
details about the dissolution of the agency will be part of the information presented in the 
following sections on the evolution of the Russian intelligentsia and the Okhrana. 
 
The Emergence of the Russian Émigré ‘Intelligentsia’ under Nicholas I 
The origins of the Russian émigré Intelligentsia and its historical role in fomenting 
political violence in Russia stemmed from the social and political repression of the elites under 
Nicholas I. The Tsar’s desire to protect the empire from the “ills of foreign influences,” 46 fueled 
his intense fear of the Russian aristocratic classes. Nicholas appointed Sergei Uvarov as the 
Minister of Public Enlightenment in 1833.  Uvarov implemented a curriculum that was designed 
to purposefully prevent the exposure of Russian youth to the ‘harmful’ and ‘idle’ ideas47 from 
the West. Uvarov believed that “it was necessary to find the principles which formed the 
distinctive character of Russia, and which belong only to Russia.”48 As a result, he ensured that 
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the belles-lettres of exalted Western thinkers such as Jean Jacques Rousseau, Joseph-Pierre 
Proudhon, Voltaire, Emmanuel Kant and Wolfgang von Goethe were strictly prohibited.  
Tsar Nicholas I used the Third Section specifically to target members of the aristocracy 
who were educated in Europe. He believed that they were the most likely to be influenced by 
Western thinking. As a result, instead of following the traditional custom of closely monitoring 
the influential members of the Tsar’s court, Nicholas I used the Third Section to closely watch 
Russia’s educated classes such as bureaucrats, officers, gentry, courtiers and its intellectual class. 
The latter received the most intense scrutiny from the Third Section. This group, who became 
famously labelled as the Russian intelligentsia, were Western educated members of the nobility 
who saw themselves as enlightened and “progressive”49 minds.  During Nicholas’ reign, the 
intelligentsia emerged as a sort of “interest group” with “abstract ideals.” 50 Among the most 
prominent members of this group were Mikhail Petrashevtsy, Alexander Herzen, Fyodor 
Dostoevsky, and Nicholay Ogarev as well as anarchist thinkers such as Mikhail Bakunin. 
Initially, the Tsar Nicholas’ harassment of the Russian intellectual class inspired the 
formation of non-violent, underground anti-tsarist revolutionary movements in the empire. 
Although his rule was not characterized by widespread dissent,51 Nicholas used the Third Section 
to arrest, imprison and exile anyone who participated in these secret organizations. These 
activities were ramped up in the aftermath of the Spring of Nations 52 in 1848 (also historically 
known as The Revolutions of 1848), as Nicholas became fearful that they would be the conduit 
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through which the social upheaval and ideas of political liberalism would enter his empire. One 
prominent example of these consortiums was a St. Petersburg-based secret society called the 
“Petrashevtsy Circle,” which was created by a Russian aristocrat is Mikhail Petrashevtsy. The 
group was exposed by the Third Section which led to his arrest in 1849 and subsequent 
sentencing to death. However, as a result of the influence of his aristocratic family, Petrashevtsy 
was sent into exile into Eastern Siberia. Fyodor Dostoevsky, one of Russia’s most celebrated 
novelists, was also arrested in 1849 for publicly reciting a censored letter which advocated for 
the abolishment of serfdom. For those alleged crimes, he was also given the death penalty but 
fortunately received a reduced sentence of four years of hard labor in the empire’s Siberian 
prison camps.  
The origins of the Russian émigré intelligentsia and its anti-tsarist activism in Europe can 
be traced to Alexander Herzen, who was considered one of the pioneer theologians of Russian 
socialism. In 1835, Herzen was arrested by the Third Section for allegedly participating in a 
gathering of students who sang songs that were disparaging of Tsar Nicholas’ character. Despite 
the secret police’s knowledge of Herzen’s active role in underground revolutionary movements, 
his family’s wealth and social connections allowed him to only be sentenced to banishment in 
Siberia until 1840. Seven years later (1847), he left Russia to escape the harsh censorship laws 
under Nicholas’ government and the constant harassment he received from the Third Section. 
Herzen settled briefly in France and Italy, before taking up permanent residence in London. 
Herzen would create the Free Russia Press in 1853, while he lived in exile in the British 
empire’s capital city.  In this publication, which he self-titled “the first independent Russian 
newspaper,’53 Herzen published editorials which castigated the repressive governance of 
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Nicholas I. In a column aimed at the intelligentsia, he called Nicholas “a cold and merciless 
being who despised the intellectuals among Russia’s elite.”54  
The Russian Intelligentsia and Political Violence under Alexander II 
The growth and radicalization of the Russian intelligentsia against the Tsarist government 
began under the rule of Nicholas I’s successor and son, Alexander II (1855-1881). Alexander II 
also feared the influence of social and political changes in Europe on the Western educated 
members of the Russian aristocracy. As a result, Alexander continued his father’s practice of 
strict censorship. However, in the early years of his rule, young men and women developed an 
insatiable appetite for forbidden literature and began to create underground literary groups to 
read these texts clandestinely. In response, the Tsar deployed the Third Section to monitor 
universities and its incognito agents began to arrest students who were caught with censored 
literature.  The spy agency’s actions sparked riots against the state’s educational practices on 
university campuses in St. Petersburg between 1861 and 1862. In reaction, the Ministry of 
Education closed universities until August of 1863. 
During the 1860s, the cohort of Russian émigré intelligentsia grew in size and became 
more boisterous in their opposition to the Tsar Alexander II.  At this historical juncture, Sergei 
Nechaev and Nicholas Ogarev were two of the most prominent members of this group who lived 
in exile on the European continent in order to escape arrest by the Third Section. These two 
intellectuals collaborated to publish a weekly newspaper entitled “Kolokol” (English translation 
“The Bell”) from Geneva, Switzerland. Nechaev wrote the supplement which lambasted the Tsar 
for the cruelty of his political police as well as his conservative, anti-liberal and anti-




aimed at both a European intellectual as well as a Russian expatriate audience. These 
compositions were disseminated in the form short pamphlets that were written in Russian, 
French, English and Italian. More significantly, some of their anti-tsarist literature would be 
smuggled back into Russia by persons such as students who studied abroad and were often read 
secretly by underground societies within the empire.  
During the late 1860s, the Tsarist government worked diligently to curtail the societal 
impact of this type of anti-establishment literature on peasants, urban industrial workers, and 
students through a constant regimen of censorship and imprisonments. Under this volatile social 
climate, Alexander II’s Third Section created a false sense of security for the realm as it 
persecuted innocent writers who posed no real threat to anyone.55 At the same time, the agency 
was too small to cope with the increased proliferation of propaganda which was made possible 
by advancements in printing technology. Alarmingly, during the final years of Tsar Alexander 
II’s reign, the Russian secret service censors only stopped 9,386 of the 93,565,260 copies of 
literature sent from abroad.56 The Third Section’s failure to prevent anti-tsarist propaganda 
literature from radicalizing Russia’s youth led to the emergence of anarchist violence against 
state officials.  
By the late 1870s, the Third Section, whose agents had been trained to primarily function 
as government censors, were not tactically prepared for the upsurge in anarchist violence 
throughout the empire. As a result, the Third Section failed to discover several assassination 
plots against Alexander II during the final years of his rule. In November 1878, a secret 
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organization  called The People’s Will (Narodnaya Volya) made three attempts to blow up 
Alexander’s train during his return journey from a holiday in the Crimea.57 On April 20th, 1879, 
the Tsar miraculously escaped unharmed despite being shot at five times by Alexander Soloviev 
as he took a short morning stroll on the grounds of the Winter Palace. Soloviev was a peasant 
born, university educated member of the revolutionary group Land and Liberty (Zemlya I volya). 
During February 1880, the Winter Palace was dramatically dynamited, but the emperor again 
escaped unharmed.58 The perpetrator Stephan Khalturin, who was also a member of the 
Narodnaya Volya, had managed to set a timebomb in the dining room of the Tsar’s residence. 
The explosion killed eleven imperial guards and wounded thirty others. Alexander and his family 
were set to have dinner with his nephew Alexander Joseph.59  
As a result of the Third Section ineptitude, Alexander II decided to dissolve it on 6th 
August 1880, eight months prior to his eventual murder. Before his assassination, the Tsar was 
convinced by his advisors that he needed to revamp the blueprint of Russia’s entire internal 
policing system in order to stymie the increasing prevalence of political violence and 
revolutionary fervor within the empire. Chief among these consultants was Count Mikhail Loris-
Melikov, a retired General of the Russian Army who had commanded forces in the country’s 
victorious Russo-Turkish War (1877-1878). Following the conflict, Melikov, a member of a 
wealthy Russian-Armenian noble family, was sent to Kharkov,60 where he was tasked with 
combatting nihilists and anarchist groups who had succeeded in killing the region’s governor, 
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Prince Dmitri Kropotkin in 1878.61 While serving as an Imperial government bureaucrat in the 
city, Melikov developed a number of novel theories on how the Russian state could solve its 
problem of rising political violence within the empire. Through his family’s influence, he was 
able to gain the trust of the Tsar and enter his tiny circle of trusted aristocrats. After convincing 
Alexander of the viability of his plans, Melikov was subsequently allowed to orchestrate the 
metamorphosis of the country’s police system. Sadly, his transformation of Russia’s internal 
security apparatus could not prevent the murder of Alexander II, which had been orchestrated by 
members of an anarchist sect called the Narodnaya Volia (The People’s Will) on March 13, 
1881.  
The Creation of the Okhrana 
The formation of the Okhrana began when the Third Section was annulled by Alexander 
II on August 6, 1880. In place of the defunct espionage agency, Count Loris-Melikov created a 
new secret police division called the Security Section (or OO)62 within the Fontanka police 
force.63 These OOs would be comprised of a small, elite unit of detectives (filery) and 
undercover agents (sekretnye sotrudniki), who were trained to specifically perform counter-
terrorist surveillance. In addition to St. Petersburg, the inaugural divisions of these Security 
Sections were also put in Moscow and Warsaw, which were also urban hubs for anarchist groups 
at the start of Alexander III’s rule. On December 3, 1882, an imperial ordinance from the 
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Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), raised the status of the OOs to full-fledged political police 
bureaus.64 As part of his bureaucratic reorganization of Russia’s police system, Melikov placed 
the control of Department of Police as well as the OOs under the administrative control of the 
MVD. In 1887, the MVD created the Special Section (Osobyi Otdel), a new bureau designed to 
oversee political police affairs throughout Russia and abroad.65 The Special Section and its 
subordinates became known the under the popular and infamous misnomer as the ‘Okhrana’.66 
By 1883, Alexander III’s assault on radical extremist organizations was spearheaded by 
the Okhrana, which functioned at the apex of the Fontanka’s political intelligence gathering 
pyramid,67 and was devoted strictly to the prevention of political crime. The Okhrana gathered 
most of its intelligence through its ‘external agency’ and ‘internal agency. Secret police staff 
who were assigned to the ‘external agency’ closely monitored revolutionary targets who had 
been chosen by OOs “chinovniki.” This title was given to a senior police official within the 
upper management of the MVD.  The OOs ‘external agents’ were usually trained to remain 
undetected while camouflaged as street vendors, bellhops, chauffeurs, sanitation workers and 
even beggars. ‘External agents’ were also required to document all of their respective targets’ 
daily interactions as well as to clandestinely interview their neighbors and acquaintances. The 
Okhrana’s ‘internal agency’ was comprised entirely of a cohort of undercover spies who 
operated as agent provocateurs. They were sent to infiltrate revolutionary organizations and 
develop close friendships with the members with whom they fomented illegal activity. Then, 
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‘internal agency’ spies would notify their superiors of planned illegal activity and the superiors 
would prevent the orchestration of a plan at the last moment by the police force.  
The legal foundation for the Okhrana’s counter-revolutionary activities were based on 
two laws Alexander III had decreed a few months after his father’s murder. On August 14th 
1881, he introduced the Reinforced Safeguard (Usilennnaia Okhrana) and the Extraordinary 
Safeguard (Chrezvychainaia Okhrana) laws (ukase).68 The Reinforced Safeguard statute gave 
the power to regional governors to imprison any resident for up to three months, forbid all social 
public gatherings, hand over “troublemakers” to military justice, and deny individual rights to 
reside in their area.69 The Extraordinary Safeguard law allowed the Tsar  to have the power to 
conduct the dismissal of “untrustworthy” civil servants who worked within government 
institutions at any moment, close institutions of higher learning for up to a month, suspend 
periodicals without warning, and jail persons who were guilty of inspiring substantial suspicion 
from the point of view of state security for up to three months.70  These edicts reflected how 
deeply Russia’s ruling and governing elites suspected everyone beyond the pale of their own 
institutions as a potential enemy.71   
In the immediate aftermath of his father’s assassination, Tsar Alexander III became 
fixated on “administrative justice aimed at ridding Russian society of those who represented a 
threat, no matter how slight or tenuous, to the continued well-being of the governing and ruling 
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elites.”72 The introduction of these new draconian legal statutes amplified the powers of the 
Russian police to an unprecedented level which caused the fate of the entire population of Russia 
to become dependent on the personal opinions of functionaries of the political police.73 At the 
same time, both statutes also allowed for Russia’s deeply embedded cultural disposition toward 
overt xenophobia during political crises to severely jaundice the empire’s police practices.  
Okhrana activities often targeted Russia’s Polish, Ukrainian, Transcaucasia as well as Jewish 
minorities.  Alexander III sanctioned by royal decree the infamous “May Laws” in 1882. These 
anti-Semitic laws, which were devised by his new Director of the MVD Dmitri Tolstoi (who 
served as Russia’s Minister of Education under his father), were specifically designed to restrict 
the ability of Jews to rent, purchase or lease properties in towns and cities outside of the Pale of 
Jewish Settlement.74  
In addition to hardcore anarchists and other anti-tsarist revolutionaries, students, 
merchants, doctors, lawyers, artist, singers, musicians, thespians, and even housewives 
comprised the approximately 4940 people who were convicted and imprisoned under these two 
statutes (the Extraordinary Safeguard and the Reinforced Safeguard )between 1881 and 1883.75 
Between 1881 and 1887, the ‘external agency’ of the Okhrana’s intelligence apparatus had 
helped to tabulate an alphabetically ordered list which contained the biographical data of 129,790 
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politically “unreliable” persons.76 Individuals on that list were often taken into custody by the 
Imperial Russian Department of Police and put on trial for either their past, present or possible 
future transgressions of political anarchism or anti-government activity. During the Tsar’ 
Alexander III’s thirteen-year rule of the Russian empire (1881-1894), 5,397 people were arrested 
and subsequently sent into exile from 4,295 cases, 77 which were created from information 
documented by agents of the Okhrana sequestered during secret surveillance operations 
throughout the country. Russia’s ethnic minorities were a conspicuous subset of the individuals 
who were both targeted and persecuted by the during Alexander III’s repression of Russian 
society. 
In the first two years of Alexander III political repression, Russian revolutionaries fled to 
Europe in greater numbers than in the previous decades. Surprisingly, on the continent, some 
discovered relatively greater freedom in the West to engage in anti-regime activities.78 Russian 
revolutionaries, who were fortunate to flee into exile on their own volition, often assimilated 
among Russophone immigrant communities in Great Britain, Switzerland, Germany, France and 
Italy. In these countries, as Alexander Herzen did from London in the 1850s, they criticized the 
severe nature of tsarist political repression. The anti-Tsarist opinions of these Russian émigré 
intelligentsia were usually fused with their respective anti-establishment viewpoints and were 
circulated in the form pamphlets. Initially, they were often distributed clandestinely among the 
Russian speaking enclaves throughout (western and central) Europe. Soon after their release on 
the continent, anti-Romanov propaganda would be read by groups of anarchists, student 
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organizations, Marxists, and other social revolutionary groups (SRs) both in Europe and within 
the Russian empire’s borders. Much to the chagrin of the respective governments of the 
European polities in which exiled Russian-speaking emigres resettled, the multi-lingual members 
of Russian intelligentsia often engaged in fomenting revolutionary extremism among the 
disenfranchised segments of the non-Russophone indigenous population. 
During the final decade of the reign Alexander III father (Alexander II), the repeated 
failures of the Third Section to prevent anarchist attacks which were perpetrated by the Tsar as 
well as other high-ranking state officials were also exacerbated by imperial police’s inability to 
clandestinely capture prominent revolutionary-minded Russian exiles on the continent.  Over this 
timeframe, the tsarist bureaucracy of Alexander II was also unable convince to the British, 
German, Austro-Hungarian, Swiss, and French governmental authorities to extradite fugitive 
Russian terrorists who lived within their respective jurisdictions. During Alexander II’s rule 
(1855-1881), there were two sociopolitical impediments to Russia’s success in negotiations 
between its tsarist officials and those of these European countries over this issue. First, 
throughout this time period, states such as Great Britain, Germany and France had adversarial 
geopolitical relationships (of varying degrees of severity) with the Imperial Russian empire. 
Second, in the absence of inter-state enmity with Russia, the judicial legislature within some 
foreign states often prevented their extradition Russian revolutionary trouble-makers living with 
their borders. During Alexander II’s tenure, Switzerland was one pertinent example of this 
dynamic. By late 1870s, Geneva had become the base for anarchist groups such as The People’s 
Will (Narodnaya Volya). However, because of a strict adherence to its own laws, Swiss 
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authorities resisted extraditing anyone charged with the commission of a political crime and its 
dilatory behavior discomforted the tsarist regime to no end.79  
The imperial bureaucracy’s failure to arrest wanted members of the Russian émigré 
intelligentsia either through international diplomatic negotiations or the Third Section’s covert 
operations on the continent, led directly to the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881. As a 
result, the during the first two years of Alexander III’s reign the high-ranking bureaucrats with 
the MVD convinced the new Tsar that he should sanction the creation of a new secret service 
agency which would operate exclusively abroad. In 1883, the Ministry of the Interior established 
the Okhrana’s international wing which was specifically tasked with the apprehension of exiled 
Russian revolutionaries who jeopardized the existence of the Russian state with their anti-tsarist 
activities from abroad.  
 
The Creation of the Okhrana’s Foreign Agentura 
In 1883, the Imperial Russian consulate in Paris was designated as the first headquarters 
for the Okhrana’s new international wing called Foreign Agentura. This western European 
location was chosen by the top brass of the MVD for three main reasons. First, by the 1880s, the 
French capital had become the home of an émigré community of approximately five-thousand 
Russians,80 and the hub for Russian revolutionary groups operating in much of Europe.81 During 
early stages of Tsar Alexander III’s ferocious suppression of all forms of anti-tsarist political 
opposition within Russian society, the Okhrana’s incessant persecution of the empire’s 
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intelligentsia quickly forced its more militant dissidents into the urban centers of western Europe. 
Some of the most influential members of Russia’s exiled extremists resided either temporarily or 
permanently in the French capital, where they had a prominent role in fomenting revolutionary 
fervor that caused an exponential increase in anti-establishment activity in France during the 
early 1880s.  
In the early stages of Tsar Alexander III’s tenure as the Imperial Russian monarch, Peter 
Kropotkin was arguably the most prominent representative of exiled Russian radicals on the 
continent. The infamous anarchist drew support for his notorious crusade against the European 
ruling elite from among Paris’ Russophone immigrant as well as native French working-class 
communities. Second, acolytes of zealots such as Kropotkin, who were swayed toward 
committing acts of political violence against either the French or Russian state, often hid among 
the Russian speaking immigrant enclave within France’s largest city. As a result, unlike in the 
decades prior to Alexander III’s rule, there was now mutual interest for an inter-agency 
collaboration between the MVD controlled Russian Department of Police and the French Surete 
Générale (French Internal Security Division) in order to share intelligence regarding Russian 
nihilist activity in France. Third, despite the adversarial geopolitical rapport between France and 
Russia since the end of the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815), the two governments gradually grew 
friendlier in the aftermath of France’s humiliating defeat in the Franco-Prussian War (July 1870-
May 1871). In the decade after the conflict, French elites believed that the only way they could 
dissuade any future military aggression from Germany was through an alliance with a military 
power like Russia. Collectively, each of these three factors made Paris the ideal choice for the 
establishments of the Foreign Agentura. As a result, from its inception, the Okhrana’s 
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relationship with the French Surete was symbiotic.82  More importantly, the French authorities 
did not view the Foreign Agentura as either a threat to their jurisdiction or operational purpose.   
 
The Training and Development of the Foreign Agentura Spies  
The Foreign Agentura’s office was located in the basement of the two-story Russian 
Consulate in Paris. Historians vary in their approximation of staff numbers. However, by most 
estimations, there were never more than five at any one time.83 The total number of operatives 
who were attached to the headquarters, from its beginnings under Paul Rachkovsky in 1885 to 
March 1917 when the revolution terminated it, was almost one thousand.84 Throughout the 
thirty-two-year lifespan of foreign Okhrana, its cohort of “chinovniki” agents were handpicked 
for their posts by Fontanka in consultation with the chief of the Foreign Agentura.85 The 
identities of the personnel attached the Paris Office was known only by the directors of the 
Okhrana, the incumbent Minister of Internal Affairs and the bureaucrats who worked separately 
for the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the Russian Consulate in Paris. Although the two 
heads of French police knew of the existence of the clandestine Agentura office, any information 
pertaining to the identity of specific agents would very rarely be disclosed to the top brass of the 
Surete General or its Paris Prefecture.  
The majority of the Agentura agents, who would work under Rachkovsky at the Paris 
Office, were prepared for their careers as foreign espionage operatives by Sergei Zubatov. He 
was the Chief Moscow Okhrana’s “Special Section”, who worked with the Imperial secret police 
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from 1889 until 1903. In 1885, Zubatov left his life as a young student revolutionary and offered 
his services to the Okhrana as an informant. Five years later, he was chosen to enlist an officer 
within the Okhrana. Zubatov switched his allegiances because he did not agree with the violent 
trajectory of the activities which were perpetrated by his radicalized peers in response to 
Alexander III’s heavy-handed, counter-revolutionary crackdown throughout the empire. Zubatov 
believed that widespread suppression of all opposition to the Tsar’s autocratic rule, would never 
fully extinguish the profound counter-cultural influence of the Russian intelligentsia. Instead, 
based on the experiences of his participation in the anti-tsarist movement as a student, he that the 
Alexander III’s harsh subjugation of revolutionaries would only strengthen their resolve against 
the Tsar’s absolutist rule. Furthermore, Zubatov understood that the rabid zealotry of the 
Okhrana, pushed the less militant away from political compromise toward an ardent devotion to 
the destruction of Russia’s existing Tsarist sociopolitical from abroad.  
In 1885, as a result of the knowledge of an anti-tsarist revolutionary, Zubatov was given a 
role as an instructor in a new Okhrana cadet training division that was established through the 
Moscow branch of the OO. The MVD created the school to train the first cohort of the Foreign 
Agentura. Zubatov was granted the permission to tailor the curriculum to reflect his philosophy 
on how recruits of the Russian secret police were to be intellectually developed and successfully 
engaged in the clandestine surveillance tactics of the enemy of the state on foreign soil. Zubatov 
indoctrinated cadets in both political and revolutionary philosophies. He had two main criteria 
for the selection of new cadets. First, they need to understand the unique attraction to the 
revolutionary movement fully, or these recruits would be unable to combat the growing 
opposition. Second, he demanded that recruits should be drawn from the same social 
backgrounds from which the revolutionaries also came. As a result, he chose trainees from social 
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classes included students, factory workers, ethnic minorities such as Jews as well as members of 
the Russian aristocracy. The increased level of education among the Agentura’s cohort of spies 
gave them the tactical intellect to match the Russian émigré intelligentsia. In his testimony for 
the Provisional Government’s Investigating Commission in 1917, Okhrana officer M. S. 
Komissarov boasted that having “intelligent people” and “university and graduates” singly 
handily gave the security police the upper hand against the liberal revolutionary movement.86 
After the creation of the empire’s first international bureau in Paris, the Russian Ministry 
of the Interior (MVD) gave three primary directives to the new agents of the Okhrana’s Foreign 
Agentura. First, they were obliged to work closely with the French authorities to conduct the 
surveillance of Russian revolutionaries arriving from Russia.87  Second, they were required to 
investigate all Russians with ties to European socialists and socialist groups.88 Third, agents were 
also tasked with discovering and eliminating all underground publishers of revolutionary 
propaganda as well as forgers of false identities and passports.89 When the Foreign Agentura was 
established,  its agency focused on the surveillance of the Russian expatriate communities in 
Paris. However, over the course of Alexander III and his successor Nicholas II (1894-1917) 
respective tenures as Tsar, the MVD’s use the agency gradually became intertwined with other 
critical aspects of Russian foreign policy toward Europe. Gradually, the Okhrana’s resources 
were used to aid the Ministry of War (Ministerstvo voyny or MB) in protecting the Empire 
against the potential hostile geopolitical intentions of rival European states such as Germany, 
Austria and the Ottoman empire, whose respective governments the Russia mistrusted. As a 
 
 






result, the Foreign Agentura’s outpost in Paris became the headquarters of Imperial Russia’s 
espionage network that was expanded across the continent.  
 
 The Expansion of the Foreign Agentura  
During the first decade of the 20h century, which also coincided with the early periods of 
Tsar Nicholas II’s tumultuous reign, the MVD established new satellite outposts of the Foreign 
Agentura’s across Europe. Each of the new offices which were designed to function as 
subsidiaries to the agency’s Paris based headquarters and were integral to the surveillance of 
countries who shared borderland regions with the Russian empire. A new bureau called the 
Balkans agency 90 was opened in Bucharest between 1900 and 1904 91 in order to monitor the 
political machinations in the volatile regions between Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian 
empire such as Serbia, Bulgaria as well as Macedonia. Also, in 1900, a Galician division92 was 
created to keep an eye on Polish nationalists in the Russian controlled Partition of Poland. The 
Tsarist government feared that they would try to garner support for a Polish separatist movement 
within Germany in order to create an independent Polish state that incorporated the Imperial 
Russian territory.   
         Also, in 1900, a Berlin Agentura 93 was also commissioned as crucial part of the MVD’s 
Okhrana expansion scheme. The inauguration of this outpost was sanctioned because,  
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increasingly after 1881, Germany became a center of Russian exile political activity.94 By the 
start of the 20th century, the city’s large and sympathetic working class presented a strong market 
for the sale of Russian political literature.95 The proceeds from this endeavor was a financial 
boon for exiled Russian revolutionaries, many whom had relocated to the German capital after 
they were hounded in Paris by agents of the Foreign Agentura. More significant, German 
industrial power had rapidly transformed the central European nation into a formidable military 
force. Germany’s evolution into potent hegemonic rival on the continent fueled Russia’s intense 
suspicion of its foreign policy initiatives. Following the failure of Russian diplomacy at the 
Congress of Berlin in 1878, the view from within the empire was that Russian concessions to 
Britain, Austria and Germany amounted to a formal abdication of its role as leader of the Slav 
peoples and Orthodoxy.96  Approximately three decades later, Russia remained entrenched in an 
intense contest for influence in the Balkans with these continental foes.  
The Berlin Agentura was established to spy on high-ranking members of the German 
government and military corps. In addition, operatives who were attached to this outpost were 
also given orders to closely watch the prominent members of the Russian émigré intelligentsia, 
who resided among the large Russophone expatriate community in the German capital. However, 
the rationale behind the Okhrana’s surveillance of the Berlin based cohort of exiled Russian 
radicals differed from those which had influenced its reconnaissance activities in those who lived 
in Paris during the early 1880s.  At the turn of the 20th century, the tsarist bureaucracy under 
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Nicholas II, were fearful that these fugitive Russian extremists could be used by the rival 
German state as instruments of state sponsored terrorism against the Imperial empire.  
During the early 20th century expansion of Russia’s spy network, Italy had become a 
haven for members of the Russian émigré intelligentsia such as Valery Burtsev and Maxim 
Gorky, who were also fugitives of the Okhrana. At that juncture, the Italian government had an 
official diplomatic alliance with both Germany and the Austria-Hungarian polity. More 
significantly, it also challenged Russia for hegemonic influence in the Balkans.  From 1900, the 
nearby region had become an important territory in the scheme of Italy’s imperialist ambitions. 
The combination of these issues magnified the threat Italy posed to the success of the 
geopolitical maneuverings of Nicholas’ government. Strangely, Russia did not open a branch of 
the Foreign Agentura in the southern Mediterranean state of Italy. While the Okhrana’s spy 
operations seemed to have flourished in France, Germany, Great Britain, as well as in the 
Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman Empires, it seems to have lacked the required organizational 
prowess to infiltrate Italy. Why did Russia fail to open a division of Foreign Agentura in Italy, 
when it was able to successfully install them in these nearby regions? 
                                  
Conclusion 
The preceding segments of this chapter were devoted to providing important background 
historical information pertaining to the Okhrana’s functional evolution.  From its inception in 
1883, through to its eventual dissolution by the Bolsheviks in 1917, the agency became an 
integral component of the Russian monarchy’s coercive apparatus. In this chapter the tsarist 
tradition of creating secret agent organizations, discussed the origins of the Russian intelligentsia 
and its impact on political repression, outlined the creation of the Okhrana, and explained the 
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social and political factors that led to the creation of the Foreign Agentura.  This chapter also 
provides the background historical information necessary to understand the case study analysis 
presented in the next chapter.  This background data is necessary to understanding three key 
social and international geopolitical factors that influenced the spy agency’s integral role in the 
Russian government’s early 20th century counterterrorism initiatives, which is discussed in 
Chapter 3. First, Italy’s anti-Russian foreign policy fueled Russia’s bad diplomatic relations with 
Italy from the early 1880s to World War I. Second, this poor geopolitical relationship hindered 
Russia’s inability to formulate a police alliance with Italy that was advantageous to St. 
Petersburg. Third, the evolution of Italy’s unique sociopolitical culture, especially under Prime 
Minister Giovanni Giolitti, stymied the effectiveness of the Okhrana’s usual tactics of 













The primary goal of this thesis is to seek an explanation for Russia’s failure to open a 
division of the Foreign Agentura in Italy during its expansion of the Okhrana across Europe from 
1900 till the commencement of World War I. Over this period, the fact that Italy challenged 
Russian hegemony in the Balkans, further accentuates the atypical nature of the omission. 
However, the successful installation of the Okhrana in nearby Berlin, Bucharest, and 
Constantinople, may suggest that the Italian exclusion was a quotient of the organizational and 
operational limitations of Russian foreign espionage. By using Italy as a case study, this chapter 
will investigate three dynamics which often determined either the success or failure of the 
Foreign Agentura’s counter-revolutionary initiatives in Europe during that timeframe. First, from 
the early 1880s to the start of World War I. Italian government regimes maintained an the overtly 
anti-Russian foreign policy agenda which fueled Italy’s bad diplomatic relationship with Russia. 
Second, Italian geopolitical hostility toward Russia hindered the tsarist bureaucracy’s ability to 
formulate a police alliance with Italy that was advantageous to St. Petersburg. Third, the 
evolution of Italy’s unique sociopolitical culture, especially under Prime Minister Giovanni 
Giolitti, (1901-1914), stymied the effectiveness of the Okhrana’s usual tactics of surveillance, 
espionage and counter-revolutionary propaganda.  
 Throughout this third chapter, my intentions are to use this historical analysis to help 
isolate the specific reasons for Russia's inability to put the Okhrana in Italy. Also, I wish to use 
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the findings from this investigation to support my argument that Russia was not immune to 
experiencing major organizational setbacks that limited the Foreign Agentura’s ability to fulfill 
its foreign-policy objectives in Europe. Ultimately, I hope that this thesis could help shift the 
historiographical assessment of the Okhrana’s international wing toward a new trajectory by 
using my discoveries to counterbalance the propensity of Russian scholars to inaccurately over 
embellish the it's prowess as an espionage agency. In the subsequent paragraphs of this case-
study, I will examine three sociopolitical factors that played a crucial role in Russia’s failure to 
expand its international spy network into Italy as it did into other European states between 1900 
and 1914. These influences include Italy’s distinctive “anti-Russian” foreign policy, the unique 
evolution of Italy’s internal policing apparatus, and the peculiarity of Italian cultural attitudes 
toward terrorism, Russian/Russophone immigrants as well as the Russian émigré intelligentsia. 
 
Italy’s “anti-Russian” foreign policy and its influence on the Foreign Agentura 
 
In this section, I will argue that Russia’s inability to open an outpost of the Okhrana in 
Italy was directly linked to the Italian government’s distinctive “anti-Russian” foreign policy 
from the early 1880s to till 1914. During this timeframe, which coincided with the pre-World 
War I evolution of Foreign Agentura’s espionage activities in Europe, the inhospitable 
geopolitical rapport between the two countries torpedoed the tsarist government’s attempts to 
replicate the successful Franco-Russian alliance against Russian anarchism with Italy.  Prior to 
the 1880s, the failures of the Third Section were exacerbated by Russia’s poor diplomatic 
relationship with European powers. During Alexander II’s rule, Russian police officials were 
often unsuccessful in capturing extremists who had escaped beyond the empire’s border into 
Europe. Foreign governments were often reluctant to acquiesce to Russia’s requests to arrest 
these targets of the Third Section. In the late 1870s, Geneva had become the base for anarchist 
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groups such as the Narodnaya Volya (or The People’s Will), who planned terrorist attacks 
against Tsarist officials. However, Swiss authorities often refuse to deliberate with the Russian 
government about these organizations. Instead, they resisted extraditing anyone charged with the 
commission of a political crime and its dilatory behavior discomforted the tsarist regime to no 
end.97  Prior to the 1880s, Russia also encountered similar frustrations with the respective 
governments of Great Britain, Germany and France.  
In the early 1880s, Alexander III’s crackdown on all forms of anti-tsarist activity forced 
revolutionaries to flee into to Europe in greater numbers.  On the continent, some discovered 
relatively greater freedom in the West to engage in anti-regime activities.98  When Alexander 
approved V.K. Plehve’s plan to put a permanent Okhrana division overseas, he understood that 
its success would require Russia to seek the approval of European leaders in order to do so. As a 
result, diplomatic relationship with states would have significant influence on its ability to use 
the Foreign Agentura overseas.  In the sections below, I show how the evolution of Russia’s 
diplomatic relationship with European powers such as France, Germany and Austria aided the 
success of the Okhrana on the continent. At the same time, Italy’s hostile and adversarial attitude 
toward the Russian government, especially during the majority of Giovanni Giovanni’s tenure as 
Prime Minister, underscored the impotence of the Foreign Agentura on the Italian peninsula. 
 
Alexander III 
 In the early 1880s, the Russian government took advantage of France's precarious 
geopolitical situation, which was adeptly employed to initiate the growth of a diplomatic alliance 
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between them. At the time, the French government was fearful of its inability to counteract 
potential German military aggression. Alexander III saw that, despite their inhospitable relations 
for much of the 19th century, France would now view Russia as an invaluable ally because they 
wished “to obtain the support of the Imperial army against Germany’s eastern frontiers in time of 
war.”99 As a result, Alexander III sanctioned the decision to begin negotiations for a potential 
France-Russian alliance against anarchism with the French President Jules Grevy's regime. The 
Tsar, did so despite the protests of his Foreign Minister N. K. Giers, who was adamant that 
Plehve’s idea that Russian Consuls would carry out higher level observation of the émigrés 
abroad100 could cause an international embarrassment for the empire. However, MVD director T. 
A. Ignataev was convinced that the French police’s decision to arrest Peter Kropotkin for 
propagandizing among French factory workers in Lyon in 1882101 was an indication that the 
French had begun to see the Russian intelligentsia activity as a serious problem. Ignatov’s 
interpretation was correct and the French allowed his ministry to create the ‘Paris Office’; a year 
later (1883). The creation of the Okhrana’s continental headquarters was a sign of their 
desperation to secure Russia’s friendship. In February 1880, a young member of the Narodnaya 
Volia named Lev Gartman fled to France to avoid capture from agents of the Third Section for 
his alleged participation in attempted assassination of the Tsar at the Winter Palace. The 
explosion killed eleven imperial guards and wounded thirty others. Alexander and his family 
were set to have dinner with his nephew Alexander Joseph.102 Without consulting the French 
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Ministry of the Interior, Gartman was arrested by the French police, who then refused to sanction 
Russia’s request for his extradition.103 
During Tsar Alexander’s thirteen-year reign, the steady growth in the strength of the 
Franco-Russian diplomatic rapport prolonged the existence of the Paris Office headquarters. 
Over this time period, intelligence strategists within the MVD were astutely cognizant of the 
French government’s desperate reliance on the international perception that a military alliance 
was the foundation of their inter-state friendship. For this reason, Russia could ensure the 
longevity of the Okhrana’s base by leveraging French fear of the motives of German, Austrian 
and British foreign policy initiatives.  The peaceful nature of the accord between the two 
countries also allowed Rachkovsky to develop the Foreign Agentura’s organizational identity 
and modus operandi in the French capital (discussed further in the third section of this chapter). 
This specific location of the agency was of vital importance because, during the 1880s, the City 
of Light had become the hub for Russian revolutionary groups operating in much of Europe.104  
Throughout his early stewardship, Rachkovsky was able to gradually improve the efficiency of 
the Okhrana’s surveillance of the Russian community in the French capital. In 1890, its prowess 
was manifested by the Agentura’s central role in the capture of Peter Lavrov, a member of the 
infamous Narodnaya Volya terrorist sect, who at the time was the most prestigious Russian 
radical living in Paris.105  During that period, the Agentura’s agents impressively seized 
approximately 6,000 copies of various revolutionary publications.106 Also, the tsarist Ministry of 
Justice brought 159 suspects to trial based on the evidence supplied by Rachkovsky and the 
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courts convicted 59 of them.107  By the end of Alexander III's rule, the establishment of an 
official Franco-Russian Alliance on January 4th 1894, allowed for the Paris Office to remain as 
the focal point of Okhrana operations on the continent through to the end of the century.  
Alexander III’s decision to take advantage of France's apprehension over its military 
inferiority to Germany, represented a success in Russian statecraft which benefitted the tsarist 
government’s ability to deploy the Okhrana overseas. However, throughout his time as Tsar, 
Alexander’s strategic manipulation of France would not have created a similarly beneficial 
alliance with Italy. On May 20, 1882, Italy had joined Germany and the Habsburg Empire in 
forming a Triple Alliance,108 which mandated that they were expected to provide military 
backing should France and Russia fight Germany and Austria-Hungary.109 Per the terms of this 
agreement, Italy did not have a hostile enemy against whom the Russian government could offer 
protection other than France. A possible French insurrection against Italy was problematic for the 
foreign policy interests of government of Alexander III because a Franco-Italian clash would 
ultimately drag Russia into an unnecessary conflict with Germany and Austria. Without the 
advantage of this geopolitical leverage, Rachkovsky would not be able to force a similar police 
alliance between the Foreign Agentura, and the Italian Ministry of the Interior’s Department of 
Public Security. 
During my archival research in Italy, I was unable to locate any correspondences between 
the two agencies which originated during the period of Alexander III’s reign (1881-1894). 
However, cooperation between the Okhrana and the Italian ministry was indeed possible in that 
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period. Within the files I studied, I found written evidence that the Italian Ministry of the 
Internal Affairs was tracking the movements of an “alleged Russian suspect” (seditente sudduto 
russo) named Vladimir Andreyevich across the country prior to Alexander II’s assassination. 110 
In January 1880, a hand-written telegraph was addressed to the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs concerning Andreyevich, who they claimed operated in Italy under the pseudonyms 
Federico Millingen and Osman-Bey.  111 In addition to this file, I discovered a number of hand-
written police reports, which provided reconnaissance information on Andreyevich’s 
whereabouts. Each of these missives were sent separately to the Ministry of Internal Affairs’ 
head office in Rome from the police department in Venice (31 July 1880), Naples (28 July 1883) 
and from Udine (27 December 1891). 112 I was unable to locate Vladimir Andreyevich’s name 
within the Hoover Institute’s Okhrana archive, nor the GARF repository of letters the Moscow 
Okhrana intercepted which were sent by Russian revolutionaries. However, along with these 
files, I observed two pamphlets in which he was organizing “nihilist” conferences to discuss the 
death of Alexander II as evidence that he indeed was fomenting revolutionary activity in Italy 
were cited as the reason for the Italian government’s surveillance.113  
 The death of Alexander III saw the end of a great period of Russian diplomacy in the 
19th century. 114 His brutal political repression of the Russian intelligentsia, which was 
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spearheaded by the Okhrana, stonewalled the monarchy’s collapse, which seemed inevitable 
after his father’s shocking assassination in 1881. Although Alexander III’s rapid restoration of 
his absolute rule was made possible by his barbarous political, religious and ethnic persecution 
of the Russian people, he quickly gained the respect and admiration of the European aristocratic 
elite. In 1894, he left a Russian empire with an excellent international prestige, which was a 
quotient of a combination of his father’s despotic rule at home and political savvy in the arena of 
foreign diplomacy. Arguably, one of Alexander III’s most important political act may have been 
his decision to allow Count Loris-Melikov to continue his overhaul of Russia’s ineffective 
internal police despite its failure to save his father’s life. Melikov’s transfprmations led directly 
to the creation of the Okhrana.  
Alexander’s approval of the Director of Department of Police, V.K. Plehve’s desire to 
develop an oversees based Okhrana division to specifically eliminate the revolutionary threat of 
the Russian émigré intelligentsia, resulted in the creation of the Foreign Agentura. During his 
tenure as Tsar, the importance of that international mission made the espionage agency into a 
crucial bureaucratic component of Russian foreign policy, which in turn granted Rachkovsky 
considerable autonomy to mold it. However, as I explained in the previous sections, the success 
of its counter-terrorist tactics relied heavily on the cooperation with the governments of the 
territories in which Agentura agents operated.  As a result, it was no coincidence that the 
majority of Rachkovsky’s best accomplishments occurred in Paris. The French authorities were 
willing to support the Okhrana’s operation in exchange for Russia’s military support. 
Alexander’s rule coincided with a sustained period relative to geopolitical peace and countries 
such as Germany and Austria were able to work with Russian authorities despite their respective 
affiliations to antipodal inter-regional pacts (such as the Triple Alliance).  
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However, by the end of Alexander III’s reign, Russia and Britain still had a deeply 
antagonistic diplomatic rapport. which stymied Rachkovsky’s desire to initiate the development 
of a similar type of cooperation with British authorities over the increased Russian intelligentsia 
activity in London. In January 1891, he secretly made a trip to the English capital in a valiant 
attempt to persuade the British police to grant the Foreign Agentura permission to arrest Valery 
Burtsev and Stepniak-Kravchinskii. Rachkovsky had received intelligence that these two key 
figures in the Narodnaya Volya’s militant wing (Boevina Organisatzii or Battle Organization)115 
were organizing the collection of funds, some of which were being used to support other groups 
such as the “nihilists”116 in Paris.117 However, several months after the futile trip the Foreign 
Agentura’s director had accepted that he could not eliminate the London based cohort of the 
Russian émigré intelligentsia because help from the British authorities could not be counted 
on.118  Under Alexander III, Italy could not provide similar organizational freedoms to the 
Okhrana because Russia had become the closest ally of its most bitter rival., France. In the 
subsequent segment, I will explain why Russia’s dependence on the benevolence of foreign 
governments further undermined its ability to use the Foreign Agentura effectively in the early 





115 Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Roma, Ministero dell’Interno, Direzione generale di Pubblica Sicurezza, Affari 




117 Zuckerman, 140-141 
 




During Nicholas II’s tenure as Tsar, Europe experienced an upsurge in anarchist activity 
which his government attempted to use to convince other countries to work with the Foreign 
Agentura. Up to that point, the assassination of Tsar Alexander II in 1881 stunned Europe to be 
sure, but it did not drive Europeans to support Count Louis Melikov’s call for an international 
agreement directed against anarchism.119 Following the assassination of French President Sadi 
Carnot in 1894, Rachkovsky was able to initiate a relationship between the Paris Office and the 
Berlin Police Presidium, which eventually led to the official establishment of the Berlin 
Agentura in 1900.120  However, the growth of a Russo-German police alliance was conditioned 
by geopolitical climate during the 1890s, in which all of the governments showed a 
determination to settle matters peacefully.121 Neither Nicholas II nor the tsarist government could 
manipulate foreign governments to do so in the aftermath of the brutal murder of Empress 
Elizabeth of Austria in 1898.  
Elizabeth I’s assassination led to the organization of an international conference against 
anarchism in Rome (24 November to 21 December, 1898), in which 54 delegates representing 
the whole of Europe attended.122  One noteworthy political outcome from the symposium was 
the creation of an Anti-Anarchist Protocol which was strongly influenced by the Russian 
delegation’s desire to initiate the promulgation of an international agreement on the handling of 
anarchism by Europe’s forces of law and order.123 Despite Russian authorities hopes to lead a 
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pan European anti-anarchist coalition, serious formal cooperation proved illusory for Russia’s 
Department of Police.124 French Ambassador Camille Barrère, who headed his country’s 
contingent at the conference, wrote in a letter that its propositions possessed no more value than 
“the paper they were written on.”125  The conference only brought tangible support for Russia’s 
counter-revolutionary agenda from Austria which was not a significant geopolitical victory for 
Russian statecraft. A year before the Habsburg monarch’s death, the former opponents agreed to 
cooperate to maintain the status quo by fostering a mutually beneficial foreign policy of non-
aggression.126 Throughout Nicholas II’s tenure, Russia’s close diplomatic relationship with 
France continued to have a significant influence on the use of the foreign Agentura. The Tsar 
visited France in 1896 and the French President visited Russia in 1897. Unfortunately, the 
Franco -Russian alliance remained strong because of the Triple Alliance and it eventually forced 
a technologically outdated Russian imperial army into war with a superior Germany in 1914. 
French economic investment continued to be a source of their diplomatic relationship by the start 
of the conflict approximately 2 billion dollars in French money was in Russian hands.127 
As a result, during the post neither Rachkovsky nor his successors were able to use 
anarchist political assassinations to persuade the Italian government to allow the Foreign 
Agentura to operate as it did in France. Unlike in the French case, Russian statecraft was stymied 
by the hostile anti-tsarist nature of Italian foreign policy since it joined the Triple Alliance in the 
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Italian anarchist named Santi Geronimo Cesario,128 Italy’s refusal to work with Russia perhaps 
stemmed from the French contemplated military retaliation on Rome.129 After Italian Luigi 
Lucheni killed Elizabeth I of Austria, the Italian government only had intentions to work with 
Switzerland.130 They were only persuaded to organize the Rome conference because the Austro-
Hungarian Foreign Minister Goluchowski asked them to do so.131  He suggested to the Italians 
that “they not limit their diplomatic initiative to Switzerland but give it a more universal 
character, involving all European states in the struggle against anarchism.”132 The Italian 
governments from Prime Ministers Marco Minghetti (1873-1876) to Giovanni Giolitti (1911-
1914) were not willing to jeopardize the relationship because “the British controlled the 
Mediterranean, and the long Italian coastline made the peninsula vulnerable”.133 
 Following the assassination of their own monarch Umberto II in 1900, the Italian 
government under Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti (1901-1914) employed a world-wide 
network of secret agents who kept him informed about anarchist intentions.134 For much of the 
pre-World War I years, Italy primarily relied on its own police to deal with any potential issue 
which could be caused by the Russian intelligentsia in across the country. During this period, 
Italian foreign policy strategies hindered any full cooperation from the Italian government in 
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helping the Foreign Agentura’s counter-revolutionary activities on the peninsula. Like Russia, 
Italy also had a strong interest in gaining both influence and territory in the nearby Balkans 
region. In 1901, the Italian government made a pact that it would help ‘work toward autonomy 
for Albania.’135 Secretly, between 1902 and 1914, Italy actually had plans to seize the province 
whenever there was a Balkans crisis.136  These imperial desires for land across the Adriatic Sea 
were one of the factors why the Italian state went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1911,137 
and worked against Russian interests during the First and Second Balkans Wars.138  
Based on the archival files I surveyed during my research in Italy, I saw very few 
examples of direct intergovernmental correspondences between Italy and Russia during Nicholas 
II’s reign. One noteworthy example of these exchanges was a highly confidential document 
which was sent from the Russian embassy in Paris to the Italian Internal Ministry’s “Department 
of Foreign Affairs” (Ministero degli affari esteri) on October 27, 1911.139 This telegram was sent 
on behalf of the Russian ambassador to Paris to inform the Italian authorities that the “Grand 
Duke of Russia” would be travelling to Italy under the pseudonym Count (Conte) Michele 
Brassow.140 The document also requested the assistance of the Italian police in providing him 
protection during an automobile journey from Sicily to a private residence on Via di Ventimiglia. 
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(See: Appendix 5).141  Ventimiglia was a small resort town located near Liguria’s border with 
France, approximately 100 miles to the southwest of Genoa.  
 Between 1900 and World War I, Russian foreign policy toward Europe failed to 
effectively deal with the demands of a geopolitical climate that grew increasingly hostile year 
after year. French foreign policy during the 1880s and 1890s remained focus on creating an 
alliance against the Germans. The close relationship with Russia was invaluable because they 
wished “to obtain the support of the Imperial against Germany’s eastern frontiers in time of 
war”.142 Likewise, in the early 1890s Russia could not afford to stand alone, particularly in the 
face of the Triple Alliance working together. 143 Their diplomatic rapport allowed the Foreign 
Agentura to continue with the headquarter in the city with the largest émigré population in 
Europe. The stability of the Franco-Russian geopolitical relationship allowed the Foreign 
Agentura stability which gave Rachkovsky an opportunity to enhance the image of the Russian 
secret service.  
However, under Nicholas II, the tsarist government operated as if the peaceful period 
under his predecessor (Alexander III) has continued uninterrupted since the 1880s. Although the 
Foreign Agentura’s importance to the survival of the monarchy grew exponentially during this 
period, the agency’s success remained inextricably linked to the strength of Russia’s alliances 
with foreign countries. Also, despite the failure of the Rome Conference in 1898, the tsarist 
government of Nicholas II remained stupidly committed to the early 1880s goal of creating an 
international alliance against anarchism.  This naive initiative remained a priority for Nicholas II 
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as the Russian Agentura was expanded to ensure that rival European governments in state-
sponsored terrorism would not use people such as Vladimir Lenin.  However, the Revolution of 
1905 and the October Revolution in 1917 were both orchestrated by the Russian émigré 
intelligentsia from abroad. Once the Italian government under Giolitti decided to place the 
Balkans region as part of its ambitious imperialist project, the likelihood that they would help the 
Russian government to deal with the debilitating effects of its émigré intelligentsia's terrorism 
was extremely low. In the following segment, I shall discuss how Russia’s inter-agency police 
alliances were a catalyst for the eventual failure of the Foreign Agentura by WW I, as the 
European political climate became infused with poisonous interstate hegemonic rivalries. 
 
Lack of Inter-agency Police Cooperation and its Influence on the Foreign Agentura 
In this section, I demonstrate the second aspect of my argument, which is to show that 
Russia’s inability to open an outpost of the Okhrana in Italy was also directly linked to Russia’s 
inability replicate inter-agency cooperation with Italy, which was as advantageous to St. 
Petersburg. the Franco-Russian police alliance. Until the reconfiguration of the Russian police in 
the early 1880s, French governments monitored the actions and thoughts of their population 
more closely and consistently than any other European system.144 Prior to 1883, there was no 
mutual interest between Russia’s Department of Police and the French Surete Générale (French 
Internal Security Division) in the sharing of intelligence regarding Russian anarchist activity in 
France. Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin escaped from Russia in 1876 prior to his trial for his 
participation in an underground anti-tsarist group called the Circle of Tchaikovsky.145 He spent 
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the majority of his subsequent forty-year exile in France where he was extremely influential in 
the country’s various anarchist movements. Kropotkin was arrested by French authorities for his 
revolutionary activities in 1882 and was subsequently jailed in Lyon for five years.146 Two years 
prior to the Russian anarchist infamous arrest, the Russian and the French government were at 
odds over the bold refusal of the latter to extradite young Narodnaya Volia terrorist Lev Gartman 
back to St. Petersburg. In the subsequent paragraphs of this section, I shall explain how the 
Franco-Russian police alliance between the Okhrana and French Surete General was a catalyst 
for the early success of the Foreign Agentura during the first decade of Peter Rachkovsky. I will 
also show that Russia’s inability to replicate the relationship between the Foreign Agentura and 
the Paris Prefecture was the primary reason for its failure to open an outpost of the Foreign 
Agentura in Italy. 
 
Alexander III 
The total number of operatives who were attached to the headquarters from its beginnings 
under Rachkovsky in 1885 to March 1917, when the revolution terminated it, was almost one 
thousand.147 Throughout his directorship period under Tsar Alexander III (1885-1894), the 
Foreign Agentura benefitted tremendously from its alliance with the Sûreté Generale of France. 
More specifically, the international Okhrana’s cooperation with its legendary subsidiary branch 
Paris Prefecture of Police that laid the foundations for the Agentura’s early success on the 
continent. By the time Rachkovsky officially took control of the Paris Office, the Prefecture was 
widely acknowledged as one of the premier police institutions in Europe. In 1871, the Paris 
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police earned plaudits among the European ruling elite for its pivotal role in restoring civil order 
during the seventy day mob rule of the Paris Commune. The Paris Prefecture was at the center of 
the French government’s crusade to restore civil order in the capital in the subsequent months. In 
the aftermath of the Commune, the government took harsh repressive action: about 38,000 were 
arrested and more than 7,000 were deported. 148 By the early 1880s, the French police agency 
had jurisdiction of an overcrowded, crime riddled, multi ethnic French capital, which grew from 
546,846 (1801) to 2,269023 (1881).149  The Prefecture’s commissioner, who was given the 
bureaucratic title of the Prefect of Paris, served as the most important non-military security 
official in the French empire. As from is control of the largest urban police brigad in the country, 
the duties of the Prefect included organizing response strategies to natural catastrophes including 
fires, floods, and epidemics outbreaks. The Prefect of Paris was also given tremendous executive 
powers to apply and enforce the execution of laws as well as regulations concerning public 
health, public morality, and public security and the proper conduct of hotels and brothels, 
churches and theatres, gambling houses, and (foreign currency) exchanges.150 
During Alexander III’s reign, Rachkovsky worked closely with  Louis Lepine, the Paris 
Prefect,  who admired the English police for its ability to foster the image of the police as the 
protector of the public good.151 As a result, during the Frenchman’s tenure 1883-1905, he 
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preferred to avoid the use of repressive police tactics in the French capital. Instead, Lepine set up 
his brigade to control the streets and conduct intense surveillance on any individual or group 
considered a potential source of disorder.152 In the first decade of the Foreign Agentura’s 
existence, Rachkovsky was cognizant of the need to ingratiate himself with the director of the 
Paris police in order to achieve his objective of eradicating anti-tsarist elements in Paris. As 
result, during the reign of Alexander III’s rule (1881-1894), he openly mimicked the modus 
operandi of Paris Prefecture because the location of the agency was crucial as, during the 1880s, 
the City of Light had become the hub for Russian revolutionary groups operating in much of 
Europe.153  Despite the lack of familiarity between the two agencies, from its inception, the 
Okhrana’s relationship with the French Surete was symbiotic.154 Fortunately, the French 
authorities did not view the Russian agency as either a threat to their jurisdiction or operational 
purpose.  After the creation of the Okhrana headquarters in Paris, the Russian Ministry of the 
Interior (MVD) gave three primary directives to the agents of the Okhrana’s Foreign Agentura. 
First, they were obliged to work closely with the French authorities to conduct the surveillance of 
Russian revolutionaries arriving from Russia.155 Second, they were required to investigate all 
Russians with ties to European socialists and socialist groups.156 Third, agents were also tasked 
with discovering and eliminating all underground publishers of revolutionary propaganda as well 
as forgers of false identities and passports.157 At home, the  Sûreté Generale regularly 
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perlustrated the mail of its suspects by bribing postmen and concierges to supply it with letters 
written by or to people under suspicion.158 Throughout this period, Rachkovsky followed the 
Paris Prefecture’s lead and was able to build the strength of the Okhrana’s surveillance of the 
Russian immigrant community residing in the French capital. In that timeframe, the Agentura’s 
agents seized approximately 6,000 copies of various revolutionary publications.159 Also, the 
tsarist Ministry of Justice brought 159 suspects to trial based on the evidence supplied by 
Rachkovsky and the courts convicted 59 of them.160 As a result of his success during the first 
decade of the Okhrana’s existence as Russia’s primary foreign spy agency, Rachkovsky’s annual 
budget had mushroomed to a stupendous 295,500 francs in 1894. No Foreign Agentura budget 
would match this sum for another 12 years.161  Russian archival documents also indicate the 
Okhrana in Russian had adopted a similar tactical strategy over the course of Alexander III’s 
rule. These GARF files were collected by the Okhrana’s ‘Special Section’ in St. Petersburg 
(Fifth Department of the Special Section of the Department of Police (secret unit). Between 1883 
and 1894, these Russian language letters were organized and filed by date, month and year, per 
the orders of The Department of Police of the Imperial Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs. 162 
During Alexander III’s rule as the Russian king (1881-1894), it was extremely difficult 
for the Foreign Agentura to replicate the success of the Franco-Russian police alliance against 
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the Russian intelligentsia elsewhere on the European continent. Beginning in the early 1880s, the 
Berlin Police Presidium had already begun to compile a register of political suspects and were 
sending undercover agents to report on their activities.163  However, in these years, political 
policing as a systemized task was. something rather new to Germany.164 Throughout Alexander 
III’s tenure, the British government considered the Okhrana little more than an extension of 
tsarist tyranny.165 Astonishingly, by the early 1890s, they only had a small political police unit 
called the “Special Branch” which only employed 25 agents that were designated toward 
surveillance of the revolutionary émigré population. During the 1880s, the Italian police system 
struggled mightily to tackle the endemic criminality, rampant anarchist violence and a volatile 
peasant population that had besieged the country. While the Okhrana’s counter revolutionary 
initiatives flourished at home and in France (with its cooperation of the Surete Generale), the 
Italian police force was too disorganized to handle its assignments.166 In addition, technical 
backwardness made record keeping and the identification of suspects a nightmare. 167 During my 
archival research in Italy, I discovered that the majority of police correspondences (sent during 
the 1880s and early 1890s were handwritten and almost illegible. (See Appendix 1 and 2). The 
inefficiency of the Italian police or Carabinieri in solving this social discord was caused by three 
problems. First, unlike Russia and France, the Italian government favored the use of non-
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specialist- army units for political policing.168 Second, since the 1870s,  standard day-to- day 
policing was entrusted to a much smaller and less adequate bodies of men from the Carabinieri’s 
civil police force called the Public Security Guards, which by the late 1880s numbered only 169 
Third, by the 1880s, the government spent only two percent of gross public expenditure on 
policing while in comparison, it used devoted twenty percent to military and naval expenditure. 
170  In addition to the geopolitical enmity between Italy and Russia, the philosophical and 
organizational structure of the Italian police system perhaps inhibited inter agency police 
cooperation between the Okhrana and Carabinieri during Alexander III’s reign.  In the following 
section, I shall explain how these different styles of pollical policing obstructed the creation of an 
inter-agency alliance between Russian and Italy during the reign of Nicholas II. 
Nicholas II 
 Nicholas II became Tsar at age twenty-six after his father Alexander III passed away 
from renal failure due to a kidney disease in 1894. In foreign affairs, Nicholas had inherited from 
his father the French alliance, of whose existence he learned only after his accession to the 
throne.171  However, Nicholas immediately understood the prudence of maintaining close 
geopolitical relationship between Russia and France. For this reason, he would visit France in 
1896, host the French president Felix Faure in St. Petersburg a year later (1897) and sanctioned 
an agreement in 1899, which would extend their military partnership indefinitely. Nicholas’ 
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strategic decision to further strengthen their diplomatic coalition during the early years of his 
tenure, helped to further solidify the cooperation between the Okhrana and the Surete Generale. 
As a result, during the first decade of his rule, the French police service, especially the Prefecture 
of Paris, became the most cooperative of all Peter Rachkovsky’s allies.172 He remained as the 
Foreign Agentura’s director for an extra eight years (1894-1906) because Nicholas II considered 
him to be one of the most devoted protectors of the regime and dynasty.173 During this period, 
Rachkovsky used his position as the head of the Okhrana’s international wing primarily to 
enhance his political reputation and prestige in Russia. He also became close acquaintances with 
several powerful individuals. Within the Russian government, among his most influential friends 
he acquired within Nicholas II’s cohort of tsarist government advisors included, I. L Gromeykin, 
(Minister of the Interior), Sergei Witte (Minister of Finance, General P.P Hesse (Imperial Court 
Commandant), Baron Morenheim (Russian Ambassador to France) and Sergei Zubatov (Director 
of the Department of Police)  
By the time Nicholas II took the throne (1894), the Okhrana had among other triumphs, 
uncovered a plot to kill Tsar Alexander III (1887), arrested Peter Lavrov, the most prestigious 
Russian radical living in Paris (1890) and turned a top Narodnaya Volia member named Lev 
Tikhomirov into a paid, Paris-based informant. Over the course of his reign, the tsarist 
government would attempt to replicate the successful the counter-revolutionary joint venture 
between the Foreign Agentura and the Paris Prefecture elsewhere on the continent.  Its desire to 
expand the Okhrana’s operations in Europe had three stages/categories. In stage one, the Russian 
government used official diplomatic channels to create an international alliance against 
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anarchism which would subsequently create an inter-agency police cooperation with the Okhrana 
against Russian revolutionaries abroad. In the second stage, they took the initiative to establish a 
relationship with high ranking police officials in the European countries in which the Russian 
émigré intelligentsia lived in exile. The third stage, the Okhrana’s “Special Section” would 
clandestinely deploy Okhrana agents across the continent without the knowledge of the foreign 
governments.   
During Nicholas II ‘s rule (1894-1917), the only country in category one would be 
France.  The diplomatic cooperation between Russia and France, which began under his father in 
the early 1880s, ensured that counter-revolutionary collaboration between the Foreign Agentura 
and the Paris Prefecture remained intact. The Franco-Russian geopolitical alliance ensured that 
their partnership allowed the Paris Office to remain the operational headquarters of the Foreign 
Agentura during its expansion from 1900 until it was disbanded by the Bolsheviks in 1917. 
Germany is an example of the second category of the Foreign Agentura’s expansion. Following 
the assassination of French President Sadi Carnot in 1894, Rachkovsky was able to initiate a 
relationship between the Paris Office and the Berlin Police Presidium, which eventually led to 
the official establishment of the Berlin Agentura in 1900.174  Under the reign of his successors, 
Leonid Rataev  ( 1902-1905), Arkady Harting (1905-1909) and Alexander Krassilinikov (1909-
1917), the Berlin Agentura primarily concerned itself with keeping track of Russian émigré in 
Germany by bribing high ranking police officials such as the German Police Commissioner.175 
Britain, Austria, the Ottoman empire and Italy, each fell into the third category of the 
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international expansion of the foreign Okhrana. Throughout his leadership of the agency, 
Rachkovsky’s attempts to foster a police alliance with the British police were repeatedly 
rebuffed.  Also, in 1900, the opening of a Galician division 176 of the Okhrana’s Foreign 
Agentura was sanctioned by the MVD. The most significant goal of this department was to 
expose underground sects of Polish anarchists, separatists and socialist revolutionaries who may 
have been attempting to garner support against the Russian state within both the Habsburg 
empire and Germany. A Balkan Agency 177 was established in Bucharest between 1900 and 1904. 
Its chief purpose was to keep an eye on Russian emigrants in Bulgaria, Serbia and Romania.178 
This secret department was also created for the tsarist government to observe the diplomatic 
machinations within their respective semi-autonomous Austro-Hungarian states.  
From around 1907, the British government began to seek improved relations with 
Tsardom,179 and eventually joined both Russian and France in the Triple Entente that would 
combat the Triple Alliance during World War I.  However, despite this shift in Anglo-Russian 
diplomatic ties, the Okhrana still had agents who were working from the office of a ‘cover firm’ 
called the “Russian Imperial Financial Agency”,180 between 1906 and 1909. In 1911, another 
version of the Balkan Agentura was commissioned in Constantinople.181 The spies within this 
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new agency were sent to observe the domestic affairs within the devolving Ottoman polity which 
had very close relations with Great Britain. In addition, they were also specifically looking into 
Turkey’s connections to Russian subjects involved in Pan-Islamist, Pan Turkish and Pan-
Armenian nationalist organizations such as the ‘Gnchak’ and ‘Dashnaktsutiun’.182 
During the reign of Tsar Nicholas II (1894-1917), there were three primary reasons for 
the tsarist government’s failure to forge an inter-agency alliance between the Foreign Agentura 
and the Italian Carabinieri. First, over the course of Nicholas’ first decade his rule, the Italian 
police system struggled mightily to tackle the endemic criminality, rampant anarchist violence 
and a volatile peasant population that had besieged the country. Unlike in both Russia and 
France, the Italian government gave the task of political policing to its military corps. Therefore, 
as a result, the Okhrana was not was not an organizational fit in Italy because it was a subsidiary 
of the Russian Department of Police.  Second, over that same time frame, the Carabinieri 
received considerably less funding than the Italian police.  The lack of financial support was the 
source of the agency’s inherent technological backwardness, which made both record keeping 
and the identification of suspects a nightmare.183  Also during these years, the Italians still lacked 
a professionalized detective force, made little of use of forensic photography, the telephone or 
the telegraph in fighting crime. 184 Third, by the start of World War I, the Italian government had 
modernized its internal police to such a level that it perhaps did not need the assistance of the 
Okhrana to help them keep track of Russian terrorists in their country. During Giovanni Giolitti’s 
successive stints as Italian Prime Minister (1901-1914), the international prestige of the 
Carabinieri grew exponentially. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Italian government 
 




established a new police academy in Rome and began to incorporate the Bertillon method of 
criminal identification into its police practices. This criminological system, which was already 
widely used throughout the continent, identified police suspects through the use of physical 
descriptions that were supplemented with a photograph. Also, during this period, the Giolitti 
government installed photographic equipment as well as laboratories in major police precincts 
throughout the country. By 1914, these technological upgrades to allowed Italian state to have 
one of the most advanced police systems on the continent at its disposal.  
During my archival research in Italy, I discovered several police documents which 
indicate that the Giolitti regime had become quite proficient in monitoring fugitive Russian 
émigré revolutionaries between 1900 and the start of World War I. The classification of these 
confidential files show that the observing Russians was a specialized duty of great significance to 
the Italian government during that period (1900-1914). Proof of my hypothesis can be found in 
two noteworthy characteristics that I noticed within the files. First, there were several telegrams 
sent to Italy’s Department of Public Security (Ministero dell'Interno: Dipartimento di Pubblica 
Sicurezza), regarding information on Italy’s Russian population, from police bureaus in 
Florence, Naples, Venice, Milan, Turin and Rome. Second, within many of the police reports, 
Russians whom they were tracking were placed into distinctive groupings. These classifications 
included “Russian persons of interest” (sudduti russi), “Russian refugees” (profughi russi), 
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Unique “Italian” sociopolitical culture and its effect on the Foreign Agentura 
When Rachkovsky took charge of the Foreign Agentura in 1885, the French capital was 
an ideal cultural fit for the implementation of his unique strategy of eliminating the influence of 
the Russian émigré intelligentsia on the continent. Rachkovsky developed the agency from the 
ground up based on two core operational and philosophical approaches. According to Russian 
law, any individual who left the Russian Empire without official permission and attained 
citizenship in another. For that act of defiance, if this “rule was violated he/she was banished and 
his his/her property was sequestered.” 186First, he would use the French media to orchestrate a 
successful propaganda campaign that painted (Russian) emigration in the darkest colors as 
possible, and as a threat to the stability of Europe.187 Second, Rachkovsky enlisted the help of 
special undercover agents to stir up confusion and discord amongst various revolutionary 
groups.188 Also, during Alexander III’s reign,  Rachkovsky would also recruit revolutionaries as 
provocateurs who could then help to discredit revolutionary proclamations and publications.189 In 
the subsequent segments of this chapter, I will show how the Okhrana’s counter revolutionary 
tactics were not able to work in Italy because, the southern Mediterranean republic had a unique 
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 For the ruling class of Russia, many of whom were educated in West Europe, public 
image of the Russian state was of major importance. As a result, in the face of a spike in political 
violence, the imperial aristocracy often hesitated to act too harshly for fear of being ridiculed by 
the civilized world and ……appearing to behave in an ‘Asiatic’ manner.190 Alexander III was 
astutely cognizant of the difficulty of navigating this cultural stigma. To ensure the survival of 
the Romanov dynasty, he had no choice but to a use a heavy-handed approach toward freeing his 
country from the perils of revolutionary extremism. As a result, his regime made three changes 
in its foreign policy. First, it worked diligently to demonize these radicals by spreading 
propaganda in Western Europe which legitimized its adoption of harsh political suppression to 
counteract the scourge of anarchism. Second, it made strong efforts to improve its diplomatic 
links with European countries. This was especially the case in those countries that had a Russian 
immigrant community and were also dealing with the problem of revolutionary extremism, such 
as France and Switzerland. Third, it used international relations to legally extend the jurisdiction 
of the Ministry of the Interior (MVD) in order to conduct special investigations of Russians 
abroad. Alexander III understood the need to both capture and monitor Russian revolutionary 
exiles in Europe because of the threat they posed to Russia’s international image, their existence 
as symbols of resistance against his regime and potential financial support they could provide to 
revolutionary movements operating within the empire. As already discussed, these rationales led 
to the establishment of an international wing of the Russia’s secret police known as the Foreign 
Agentura (Zagranisaia agentura).191 A conspicuous component of Rachkovsky’s strategy was 
 
190 Pipes, 314 
 
191 Zuckerman, 43 
 
 72 
the use of anti-Semitic propaganda, which was done to specifically demonize the Jewish 
emigrants who left the empire and relocated in the urban centers of Europe such as Paris. In 
Russia, Alexander III sanctioned by royal decree the infamous “May Laws” in 1882. These anti-
Semitic laws were a critical factor in roughly 225,000 Jewish families who fled Russia between 
April 1881 and June 1882.192 One noteworthy example of Rachkovsky’s overt slander of the 
Jewish population in France (and Europe) came from a propaganda literature which he released 
under the pseudonym Jehvan Preval in 1892 called Anarchy and Nihilism (Anarchie et 
Nihilisme). In the text, the mischievous director of the Foreign Agentura argued, among other 
things, that following the French Revolution the Jews had become the masters of the continent, 
“governing by discreet means both monarchies and republics”193 The book also claimed that an 
international syndicate of extremely rich and powerful European Jews plotted to overthrow the 
Russian Empire and thereby remove the only obstacle to worldwide domination.194 
Rachkovsky’s incendiary remarks were intended to mobilize French society, which by the 1890s 
was just as virulently anti-Semitic as Russian society. In France, since the early 1880s, an 
unending flood of anti-Semitic novels developing the image of the rapacious, immoral and 
intolerant Jew, rolled off the printing press.195 During the same period, like Rachkovsky’s text, 
some of the best-selling anti-Semitic French novels were immediately translated into German 
contributing to the intensification of anti-Jewish sentiment in Germany.196 
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Alongside this strategy of influencing French public opinion, he would deploy his agents 
to perform acts of provocation that reinforced and contributed to the Foreign Agentura’s anti-
émigré propaganda and undermined Russian emigration from within.197  In France, “Russians 
perfected the art of the agent provocateur.”198 This French term describes an espionage technique 
that was often used by the Agentura to infiltrate a European-based underground terrorist 
organization that was run by one or more fugitive Russian extremists. Okhrana agents would join 
a radical group and purposefully steer its members towards committing acts of violence. 
However, the agent would tip off the local authorities about the groups plan and whereabouts 
prior to the carrying out the crime. Agentura agents would often impersonate Russian 
revolutionaries in such a manner to stir up trouble as well as to incite civil unrest in order to 
"scare the French to undertake punitive actions against Russian radicals and to cooperate with 
the Okhrana.”199  In 1890, Rachkovsky would famously us an Okhrana agent named Abram 
Landezen to initiate a fake plot to assassinate Tsar Alexander III. The Foreign Agentura’s 
Director instructed Landezen to form an underground terrorist cell that would be interested in 
creating and smuggling a bomb into Russia. The agent was given funds to set up a bomb factory 
in the outskirts of Paris. On 28 May, Rachkovsky tipped off the Paris police about the plot. The 
Prefecture subsequently arrested nine individuals along with carrying out massive sweeps into 
the homes of both Polish and Russian emigres. 200 Landezen was not among the individuals who 
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Rachkovsky’s favor. As a result of what historians call the Landezen Affair, he was able to 
simultaneously galvanize French public opinion against Russian revolutionaries and solidify the 
Agentura’s police cooperation with the Paris Prefecture. 
 
Nicholas II 
By the late 19th century, France was still jaded from the failed assassination attempt on 
the life of Napoleon III, which killed 8 people and wounded 142 at the Paris Opera in 1858. 
However, the assassination of the French President Sadi Carnot did not push the government of 
Frederico Crispi to help the Okhrana apprehend Russian terrorists who lived in Italy. The tsarist 
propaganda, designed to demonize the Russian revolutionaries on the continent, put fear in the 
minds of the French elite who witnessed an alarming influx of Russian refugees entering their 
country from the late 1890s.  In Italy, despite the small number of Russian expatriates, there was 
a special bond between Russian and Italian radical traditions. 201 This was exemplified by the 
celebration of the centenary of Garibaldi’s birth by Russian emigres of a every political stripe. 202  
This was part of the allure that attracted revolutionary elements to the country. Among this 
Russian diaspora, there were fugitive revolutionaries who were wanted by the Russian 
government. One example is the legendary Russian anarchist Mikhail Bakunin, a friend of Italian 
national heroes such as Garibaldi and Guiseppe Mazzini, who was influential in forming early 
Italian socialist groups in Naples and he argued that the Italian social revolution must aim for the 
abolition of the state.203 His rhetoric enticed a devoted legion of anti-establishment minded 
 








Italian revolutionaries who remained zealously committed to his idea of the destruction of the 
Italian state. Arguably, Bakunin played a crucial role in Italy becoming the home of one of 
Europe’s most dangerous anarchist cultures between 1870s and 1914. By 1872, Naples had the 
largest anarchist federation in Italy and Bologna had 76 anarchist sections in 1876.204 In the latter 
decades of the 19th century, these groups engaged in a politically motivated series of disturbances 
and atrocities and bloody murders205 throughout the country, which were aimed at destabilizing 
the Italian government. The activities of Italian anarchists, occurred as a result of Russian 
political exiles who were fomenting revolutionary activity throughout the unified Italian 
peninsula. They were motivated toward extremist violence by prominent Italian such as Enrico 
Malatesta, Salvatore Ingregos, Francesco Merlino and Luigi Galleani. Each of these men were 
acolytes of Mikhail Bakunin and Sergei Nechaev. These activities were punctuated, when the 
Italian King Umberto I was shot four times by Italian anarchist Gaetano Bresci in 1900. During 
his trial, the Italian confessed that his actions were influenced by a Russian revolutionary in exile 
named Emma Goldman, whom he befriended during the time he emigrated to the United States 
six years prior. 
Throughout the tenure of Tsar Nicholas II, Rachkovsky’s tactics of deliberate 
provocation of However, this the tactic of the agent provocateur could not work as well in Italy 
as it did in France because the demographics of the Russian population were different. The 
Russophone/Russian diaspora in Italy grew from 1,387 persons in 1881 to 1,892 by 1911.206  
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Further analysis indicates that roughly sixty percent207 of them were living in Italy’s northern 
provinces. The majority of the group lived in the province’s industrial port and capital city of 
Genoa. The rest stayed in resort towns along Liguria’s picturesque seaboard such as La Spezia, 
Cavi di Lavagna, Ravello and San Remo. This coastline was given the moniker of the “Italian 
Riviera” as a result of the similarity of its scenic Mediterranean oceanfront with the more famous 
“French Riviera,” which runs contiguously from the French border to its west. Despite the small 
size of this Russian speaking diaspora in Italy, Liguria’s closeness to the French border as well 
as its mild Mediterranean winter climate attracted fugitive Russian extremists.  San Remo 
became the base for the SR terrorist Battle Organization and a popular retreat for feared 
revolutionaries such as Boris Savinkov, Peter Karpovich, Vladimir Burtsev and Mark 
Natanson.208  The Russian Ministry of Interior (MVD) grew increasingly impatient and frustrated 
with the Italian government’s continued refusal to either grant their petitions for extradition of 
fugitive Russian emigres or allow Okhrana’s Foreign Agentura to engage espionage activities on 
Italian soil. In 1910, the agency recruited an Italian by the name of Eugene Intermezzi to conduct 
the surveillance of Russians in Cavi di Lavagna by undertaking the perlustration of émigré 
mail.209 Intermezzi gained the trust of local postal workers whom he placed on his official 
payroll. These individuals allowed him to view and make wax copies of correspondences 
between emigres. These copies were subsequently sent to the agency’s headquarters in Paris. 
Intermezzi success saw the Okhrana send Russians with the knowledge of Italian to infiltrate 
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individuals within these communities lived in isolation from the Italian population, in some 
cases, it became easy for them to detect Okhrana operatives.  Strangely, in Italy, the 
revolutionaries thought this was their most secure and welcoming refuge.210 This feeling of 
safety moved Georgi Plekhanov to pen an open letter of gratitude to the Italian people in a 
newspaper called The People of Italy (Il Popolo d’Italia).211 Plekhanov, considered as the Father 
of Russian Marxism, lived for many years as an exile in Italy with his wife where he established 
a sanitarium in the Ligurian town of San Remo. In the correspondence, he said that “most 
banished Russians came to Italy seeking refuge…and they always found the widest hospitality 
and the noblest sympathy”. 212  Maxim Gorky relocated from Russia (via a short stay in the 
United States) to the island of Capri, off the coast of Naples in 1906. He lived on the island until 
1913, where he set up a school dedicated to teaching his brand of Marxist theory.  On the Isle of 
Capri, Gorky was joined by Russian intellectuals who had fled from Russia such as Alexander 
Bogdanov, Vladimir Bazarov and Anatoly Lunacharsky. His school attracted both veteran 
revolutionaries who would teach there and “green youth” from Russia who wished to be taught 
by them. The future leader of the Bolsheviks first visited Gorky in Capri on April 23, 1908, 
staying until April 30. The primary reason for the visit was to explore whether a theoretical 
quarrel brewing between Lenin and the teachers at Gorky’s Capri party school could be averted. 
1 Each of these men were wanted by the Paris Office and its Foreign Agentura. 
One pertinent example of the manner in which the Italian authorities monitored the 









Russian Colony),213 which was received by this ministry from the Police Department of Genoa 
(Prefecture di Genova) on March 14, 1911.214 The contents of this particular document stated 
that the Genovese authorities were aware of the existence of “approximately 800 (eight hundred) 
Russian persons” who resided in Nervi. 215 This locale, was a district that was located on the 
outskirts Genoa, the capital city of the northern Italian province of Liguria. This telegrammed 
correspondence, which was addressed to the ministry’s director named Luigi Luzzati,216 also 
included a further demographic breakdown of this national group. It estimated that within this 
particular enclave of Russians, about “three hundred (300) lived in various hotels and five 
hundred (500) were tenants of various landlords.217 I was not able to find any overt examples of 
anti-Semitism in the Italian authority’s collection of intelligence on the Russian/Russophone 
community in Italy.  
 
Conclusion 
  By using Italy as a case study, this chapter investigated how Russian statecraft and 
foreign policy, the Okhrana's police alliances, and intrinsic socio-political cultures influenced 
how the tsarist government used the Foreign Agentura on the continent. Since each of these three 
dynamics often determined either the success or failure of the agency's counter-revolutionary 
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initiatives, this analysis helped to isolate three specific reasons for Russia's inability to put the 
Okhrana in Italy. These rationales were based on using primary and secondary source materials 
to compare Italy, the least successful region for Agentura activity, with France, which was 
arguably the most successful region for Agentura activity. First, Russia was unable to open an 
office of the Foreign Agentura in Italy because it was unable to replicate the unique diplomatic 
relationship it had with France. Second, Russia was unable to place an outpost of the Foreign 
Agentura in Italy because of its inability to replicate the successful Franco-Russian police 
alliance with Italian authorities. Third, Russia was unable to open an outpost of the Foreign 
Agentura in Italy because the southern Mediterranean polity was socially and politically different 
than Russia and other countries where the Foreign Agentura took root. In the next chapter  
(Conclusion), each of these three hypotheses will be further discussed as part of a didactic 
exercise to show that Italy’s omission form the Foreign Agentura expansion was a quotient of the 





Chapter 4: Conclusion 
Introduction 
The primary purpose of this essay is to isolate the historical reasons for Russia's failure to 
establish an outpost of the Okhrana's Foreign Agentura in Italy between 1900 and 1914. During 
this timeframe, the tsarist government under Nicholas II (1894-1917) gradually added new 
divisions in order to increase the agency's spy activities throughout Europe. Strangely, while 
Russia failed to expand into Italian territory, it successfully installed branches of the Agentura in 
nearby Paris, Zurich, Geneva, Berlin, Bucharest, and Constantinople. Although the Okhrana’s 
counter-revolutionary activities seemed to have flourished in these nearby locations, it appears to 
have lacked the requisite organizational prowess to infiltrate Italian sovereign territory.  
In the second chapter, I provided historical information about the origins of the Okhrana 
in the early years of Tsar Alexander III’s reign as well as the sociopolitical factors that 
influenced its bureaucratic evolution of its Foreign Agentura during tumultuous rule of his 
successor, Nicholas II. The chapter explains that the Okhrana was a late 19th century 
evolutionary step of a behavioral tradition among Russian monarchs to instinctively create 
autonomous organizations of secret agents, which they personally directed to identify and 
eliminate political threats to their autocratic rule. The creation of the Okhrana after the 
assassination of Alexander II (1855-1881) as well as the social and political factors that led to the 
creation of the Foreign Agentura early in Alexander III’s tenure (1881-1894). This didactic 
organization of pertinent background information is designed to inform the reader about the key 
social and international geopolitical factors which had a significant influence on both the success 
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and failure the Russian government’s early 20th century counterterrorism initiatives.  In addition, 
the data presented in chapter two, gives insight into the rationale behind the tsarist government’s 
deployment of the Okhrana on the European continent during the respective tenures of its six 
directors.218   
The third chapter revolves around my use of Italy (1883-1914) as a case study to 
investigate how Russian statesmanship/statecraft, the Okhrana's police alliances, and intrinsic 
socio-political cultures influenced the Russia’s ability to employ the Foreign Agentura to fulfil 
its foreign policy objectives pertaining to hegemony in Europe. The case study chapter’s analysis 
provides a historical lens through which I isolate some of the specific reasons for Russia's 
inability to put the Okhrana in Italy. In this chapter, I compare and contrast the Foreign 
Agentura’s activities in other states with its initiatives Italy to show how each of these three 
dynamics often determined either the success or failure of the agency's counter-revolutionary 
initiatives in Europe.  
 
The Argument (Recapped) 
Over the course of the post-1900 expansion of the Okhrana’s Foreign Agentura, there 
were three critical historical factors which combined to accentuate the atypical nature of Italy’s 
conspicuous omission from the Russian Ministry of the Interior’s (MVD) European-based 
intelligence network. First, during this timeframe, the Italian government under Prime Minister 
Giovanni Giolitti (1901-1914) openly challenged Russian hegemony in the Balkans. Second, the 
Giolitti regime also maintained Italy’s participation in the Triple Alliance (1882). This inter-
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governmental pact mandated the country’s military allegiance to both Germany and the Austro-
Hungarian polity against the Russian empire. Roughly two decades later, the treaty between 
these three states, was the geopolitical catalyst for Italy’s overtly hostile diplomatic rapport with 
Russia. Third, from the turn of the 20th century, the southern Mediterranean republic gradually 
became a new hub for anti-tsarist revolutionary activity. The Italian peninsula’s warmer winter 
climate, its many picturesque resort towns along its coastlines, and the allure of its cultural 
landmarks made Italy a popular retreat for feared revolutionaries such as Boris Savinkov, Peter 
Karpovich, Vladimir Burtsev and Mark Natanson.219 These revolutionary-minded members of 
this exiled Russian social caste, challenged the legitimacy of Nicholas' rule through the 
orchestration of anarchist attacks on high-profile members of the Russian police and the 
dissemination anti-tsarist propaganda literature from abroad. This conspicuous failure of Russia's 
spy network to gain a permanent base in Italy, suggests that Italy’s exclusion from the Foreign 
Agentura’s enlargement process was a quotient of the organizational and operational limitations 
of Russian foreign policy.  
My hypothesis contradicts the general depictions of the Foreign Agentura made by the 
limited number of Russian scholars who have produced academic literature on the Okhrana. 
Among this group includes several influential Western social scientists such as historian Richard 
Pipes, Richard Deacon, Fredrick Zuckerman, Ben Fisher, Barbara Jelavich, Dominic Lieven and 
Gregory Hingley. I argue that the lack of analytical diversity in the historiography has strongly 
influenced a tendency among these academics to over-exaggerate the Okhrana's effect on 20th-
century international espionage, the cleverness of its agents, the ingenuity of the tactical counter-
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revolutionary acumen of its directors and its pivotal role in the prevention of the Romanov 
dynasty’s demise until 1917. 
In this thesis, I identify three factors that led to Russia’s inability to establish an Okhrana 
presence in Italy.  First, Russia was unable to open an office of the Foreign Agentura in Italy 
because it was unable to replicate the unique diplomatic relationship it had with France. In the 
early 1880s, the Russian government was able to take advantage of French government’s intense 
fear of Germany’s military aggression. France’s geopolitical isolation forced its government to 
change its traditional antagonistic attitude toward Russia in order to have it as a military ally 
France could call on in case it needed to fight a war against Germany. The Franco-Prussian 
geopolitical alliance provided Russia with an excellent opportunity to extend the operations of 
the Okhrana in Paris, which by the 1880s had become the largest urban center for Russian 
revolutionary activity.  The strengthening of the relations between the two states until World 
War I, crucially allowed the Paris Office to remain as the center of Russia’s espionage network 
in Europe.  
Unlike in France, Russian statecraft was unable to manipulate Italy in a similar manner to 
create a favorable relationship with Italy. In 1882, Italy had joined Germany and the Habsburg 
Empire in forming a Triple Alliance 220 in which Italy was expected to provide military backing 
should France and Russia fight Germany and Austria-Hungary.221 Per the terms of this 
agreement, Italy did not have any potential enemies against which Russia could leverage its 
standing as a military power to offer protection. Also, unlike in the French case, Russian 
statecraft was stymied by the hostile anti-tsarist nature of Italian foreign policy since it joined the 
 





Triple Alliance in the early 1880s. From the early 1880s through to World War I, the Balkans 
region became increasingly important to Italian imperialist ambitions, especially as the Italian 
government found it difficult to manage and control its territorial acquisitions in North African 
and East Africa.  
Since countries such as Serbia and Macedonia were closer and already under the control 
of Italian ally Austria, successive Italian governments, from Crispi to Giolitti found it more 
geopolitically viable to challenge Russian hegemony in the Balkan region. Secretly, between 
1902 and 1914, Italy actually had plans to seize the province whenever there was a Balkans 
crisis.222 These imperial desires for land across the Adriatic Sea were one of the factors why the 
Italian state went to war with the Ottoman Empire in 1911,223 and worked against Russian 
interests during the First and Second Balkans Wars.224 During this period, Italian foreign policy 
strategies hindered any full cooperation from the Italian government in helping the Foreign 
Agentura’s counter-revolutionary activities on the peninsula.  
Second, Russia was unable to place an outpost of the Foreign Agentura in Italy because 
of its inability to replicate the successful Franco-Russian police alliance with Italian authorities. 
Until the reconfiguration of the Russian police in the early 1880s, French governments 
monitored the actions and thoughts of their population more closely and consistently than any 
other European system.225 When the Foreign Agentura was created in the early 1880s, from its 
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authorities did not view the Russian agency as either a threat to their jurisdiction or operational 
purpose.  Secondary sources such as Frederick Zuckerman point to the fact that from the early 
1880s to 1900, Italian police were not as technologically savvy to work with the Okhrana. 
Primary source documents, such as the government documents pertaining to the search for 
Osman-Bey show that Italians were still doing handwritten documents until the early 20th 
century. The lack of the creation of an inter-police alliance with the Italian police in the 1880s 
made it difficult to do so in the early 20th century, when challenging Russian hegemony in the 
Balkans became a central component of the Italian government’s foreign policy agenda. 
Following the assassination of their own monarch Umberto II in 1900, the Italian government 
under Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti (1901-1914) employed a world-wide network of secret 
agents who kept him informed about anarchist intentions.227 For much of the pre-World War I 
years, Italy primarily relied on its own police to deal with any potential issue which could be 
caused by the Russian intelligentsia in across the country.  Italy did not need to cooperate with 
the Russian secret police agency. 
Despite the small population of Russian emigres in the country, the Italian government 
closely monitored the various Russian communities. Italian secret agents of the country’s 
Ministry of the Interior documented the dates of their arrival, their places of residence, with 
whom they fraternized and provided details of their physical descriptions in their reports. For 
many Russians in Italy, the small towns along the picturesque Mediterranean coastline of the 
northern Italian province of Liguria such as La Spezia, Cavi di Lavagna and San Remo were 
popular destinations. In the latter, the apparent ambivalence of the Italian government toward 
Russian immigrants allowed the town’s beach resorts to become a retreat for prominent members 
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of the Social Revolutionaries (SR) terrorist Battle Organization.  Secondary sources provide 
evidence that the Russian Ministry of Interior (MVD) grew increasingly impatient and frustrated 
with the Italian government’s continued refusal to either grant their petitions for extradition of 
fugitive Russian emigres or allow Okhrana’s Foreign Agentura to engage in espionage activities 
on Italian soil.  Primary sources provide little evidence of any inter-police cooperation between 
Russia and Italy. They actually provide evidence of a few attempts by the Russian authorities 
through the Paris Office to foster a friendship indirectly via the Italian embassy in Paris. Primary 
sources show that, at the turn of the 20th century, the Italian authorities were capable of 
monitoring the Russian community by themselves. Secondary sources indicate Russia failed at 
going it on their own as they perhaps were forced to rely on limited amounts of Italian police 
information. Secondary sources show that Russia was very unsuccessful at catching terrorists 
and these failures exposed the organizational limitation of the Foreign Agentura and prowess of 
their agents. 
Third, Russia was unable to open an outpost of the Foreign Agentura in Italy because the 
southern Mediterranean polity was socially and politically different than Russia and other 
countries where the Foreign Agentura had operations. When the Okhrana began its operations in 
Russia in the early 1880s, xenophobia and anti-Semitism, which was endemic in Russian society 
at the time, jaundiced the police practices. In the empire, Russian nationalism was a strong 
element of Tsarist political power since the days of Nicholas I (1825-1855) and the Russian 
Orthodox Church was at the center of that. Therefore, Alexander III’s repression of Russian 
society largely targeted Jews as well as other minorities such as Ukrainians and Poles, who fled 
the empire in the thousands to avoid persecution. The same dynamics continued under Nicholas 
II as he struggled to prevent Russian revolutionary challenge to his absolutist rule. When 
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Rachkovsky took control of the Foreign Agentura, he used two tactics in his assault on Russian 
émigré political activity. First, he used the French media to orchestrate a successful propaganda 
campaign that painted Russian emigration in the darkest colors as possible, and as a threat to the 
stability of Europe.228 Alongside this strategy of manipulating French public opinion, 
Rachkovsky deployed his agents to perform acts of provocation that reinforced and contributed 
to the Foreign Agentura’s anti-émigré propaganda and undermined Russian emigration from 
within.229 At the time, France was the largest Catholic country in Europe and Rachkovsky was 
able to be successful because anti-Semitism and Xenophobia was also rampant in French society 
during the approximately four decades of the Foreign Agentura’s existence. Germany and 
Austria, which were once part of the Holy Roman empire were two Christian polities in which 
the Jewish minority was much maligned. Therefore, even under Rataev and Harting, the Foreign 
Agentura could rely on demonizing Russian emigration and Jewish membership among the 
Russian intelligentsia cohort in order to maintain the clandestine support of French politicians for 
its counter revolutionary activity. French society was easier to manipulate after assassinations, 
(such as the murder of French President Sadi Carnot in1894) to rally support. Especially as the 
Russian community in France grew from around 5000 persons at the start of the 1980s to 
approximately 35000 by 1911. As a result, production of anti-revolutionary propaganda as well 
as the use of the agent provocateur flourished in France, Germany, Austria. 
However, over the course of the Foreign Agentura’s existence, Italian society had 
different cultural attitudes and tropes which nullified the Okhrana’s reliance on anti-
revolutionary propaganda and counter revolutionary practices such as the use of the agent 
 




provocateur. Although Italy was a Catholic society, anti-Semitism was not as strong as it was in 
France and Germany. The majority of Russophone Jews lived in Genoa, Liguria.  In 1860, 
Liguria was annexed to the Kingdom of Italy. The history of the post-united Liguria, Genoa, 
became the natural port of Piedmont. Nonetheless, the city benefited from the great economic 
reforms during the early years of Italy’s existence as a sovereign polity. In this period, Genoa 
received an extraordinary impulse towards the renewal of its ancient naval and shipbuilding 
tradition and acquired a leading function in driving the development. Since 1848 the Russian 
emigre community in Italy steadily increased. In 1901 it numbered about 1,000 souls. In Italy, 
especially after 1900, when Italian monarch Umberto II was killed the Italian government was 
equally as repressive as the Tsarist government in Russia. However, since the Russian 
community was small and lived primarily in Liguria’s Mediterranean beach resort towns along 
the Italian Riviera such as Cavi Di Lavagna, Porto Maurizio and San Remo, it was easy for the 
Italian police to monitor them without assistance from Russia’s Okhrana.  Since people such as 
Maxim Gorky came to Italy and did not participate in anarchist activities, there was neither a 
cultural fear of Russian immigration or Russian anarchism for the Russian government to exploit 
as they did in France. As a result, although the Foreign Agentura sent agents into Italy, it did not 
have the social and political support in Italy and could not be successful in catching wanted 




The goal of this project was to seek answers to Russia's failure to open a bureau of the 
Okhrana in Italy between 1900 and the start of World War I. This essay achieved this objective 
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through its specific investigation into the reasons why the Russian government was unsuccessful, 
despite the numerous geopolitical conundrums Italy provided, which hindered Russian foreign 
policy objectives concerning Europe. By answering this research question, I argue that Russia 
was not immune to experiencing major organizational setbacks that limited the Foreign 
Agentura’s prowess in achieving its foreign-policy objectives in Europe.  Based on my survey of 
primary and secondary sources, I was able to use this analysis to isolate three specific reasons for 
Russia's inability to put the Okhrana in Italy. These rationales were based on using primary and 
secondary source materials to compare Italy, the least successful region for Agentura activity, 
with France, which was arguably the most successful region for Agentura activity. Ultimately, I 
hope that this thesis could help shift the historiographical assessment of the Okhrana’s 
international wing toward a new trajectory by using my discoveries to counterbalance the 
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